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I.          INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11, 2001, the operations and capabilities of international terrorist 
organizations throughout the world have been investigated with a heightened sense of 
urgency.  This increased attention illuminates the central role far –reaching and complex 
financial infrastructures play in the ability of these terrorist organizations to maintain 
their global influence.1  States and diasporas are significant sponsors of terrorist 
organizations.  Diaspora support will likely become increasingly vital for terrorist 
organizations to continue their operations as the current U.S.-sponsored global war on 
terror will decrease the quantity and quality of state sponsored support for terror 
organizations.2  Understandably, the operations of terrorist organizations with global 
capabilities and that are motivated by fundamental Islamic ideology have received 
increased attention from academics and politicians.  Not understandable however, the 
overwhelming majority of this attention has been directed toward understanding al 
Qaeda’s international network and the capability of its operations.  A more 
comprehensive understanding of al Qaeda’s capabilities and intentions will undoubtedly 
increase the security of the U.S., and thus merits significant attention.  However, the 
capabilities, operations, and intentions of other terrorist organizations (that pose 
significant threats to U.S. national security) must not be over looked in the effort to 
thwart al Qaeda.   
In September 2002, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage identified 
Hizballah as the “A-team” of terrorism.  With this comment, Richard Armitage expressed 
the comparative advantage Hizballah has over al Qaeda in reference to their global 
support and operations infrastructure and demonstrated ability to conduct acts of 
international terrorism.  Similarly, President George W. Bush identified Hizballah as a 
terrorist group with "global reach" in his 2002 State of the Union address.  Considering 
the extensive infrastructure and capabilities Hizballah has developed since its 
                                                 
1 Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism is Financed and How to Stop It.  Chicago: Bonus 
Books, 2003, p. 1. 
2 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND, 2001. p. 42.  
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establishment in 1982, and the significant amount of violence against American targets it 
has been responsible for, it is time to shift the focus of U.S. counter-terrorism attention 
and efforts from predominantly targeting al Qaeda to also include Hizballah.   
A. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a framework to help identify where and 
how Hizballah carries out fundraising operations in Latin America.  A review of the 
collective bodies of literature on terrorist fundraising operations and environmental 
factors conducive to terrorist operations will be conducted to identify factors that 
facilitate terrorist fundraising operations.  To date, most of the attention of international 
counter-terrorist organizations has been directed toward Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay and 
information generated by investigations of Hizballah’s activities in Paraguay will be used 
to validate the framework developed in this thesis.  Increased focus on the TBA after the 
Hizballah-linked bombings in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the Argentine-Israeli Mutual 
Association in 1994,3 and again after the terrorist attacks of September 11 in the United 
States, has brought with it increased understanding of Hizballah’s fundraising operations 
in the area, but also has had the unintended impact of leading Hizballah to shift its 
fundraising operations to other areas of Latin America.  The location, nature, and extent 
of these activities are largely unknown.     
Accordingly, the central research question this thesis will answer is: What is the 
nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Latin America?  
Subsequently, three sub-questions will be examined to comprehensively answer the main 
research question:     
1) What generalizations can be made about how and where terrorist 
organizations conduct fundraising operations? 
2) What is the modus operandi for Hizballah’s fundraising operations in the 
TBA? 
3) To what extent can we expect this model to be used for fundraising operations 
elsewhere in Latin America? 
 
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that these fundraising operations will be 
developed in permissive (or hospitable) environments according to the specific 
                                                 
3 Mario Daniel Montoya, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, No. 12, December 2001, pp. 13-14. 
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characteristics of each particular permissive environment.  Variations in significant 
characteristics of each environment will determine the extent of the similarity or 
divergence evident in the fundraising operations used.  For example, Paraguay’s geo-
strategic proximity to the free trade zone of the TBA is conducive to piracy and money 
laundering and explains their use by Hizballah.  Also, high levels of communal and 
ideological support for Hizballah from Paraguay’s Lebanese diaspora are conducive to 
extortion and donations and explain their use.  Conversely, low levels of communal and 
ideological support for Hizballah from Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora explain why no 
evidence exists indicating Hizballah uses extortion and donations for fundraising 
operations.  Also, Ecuador’s geo-strategic proximity to Colombia’s drug trafficking zone 
operated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is conducive to drug 
trafficking and money laundering and explains their use.                    
B. SCOPE 
This thesis will attempt to determine how host-nation characteristics, geo-strategic 
variables, and diaspora characteristics combine to influence the nature and significance of 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Latin America.  The analysis of host-nation 
characteristics will focus the extent to which the degree of an environment’s 
permissiveness influences the nature of the fundraising operations.  Permissive threat 
environments are defined by their possession of the following characteristics: weak 
political institutions, widespread government corruption, weak legal framework relating 
to terrorism and money laundering.  The plethora of countries not typically identified as 
having weak government institutions or widespread corruption but which can 
nevertheless be a hospitable environment for terrorist operations highlights the 
importance of the existence of geo-strategic characteristics and influential diasporas in 
the identification of such environments.  The analysis of geo-strategic variables will 
focus on an environment’s proximity to free trade or drug trafficking zones.  The 
combination of these characteristics often provides the economic infrastructure and 
sufficient profit potential necessary for successful fundraising operations.  The analysis of 
diasporas will focus on the levels of communal and ideological support they have for 
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Hizballah, which is in turn shaped by the diaspora’s motivation for migration and its 
religious composition.4   
C. METHODOLOGY   
This thesis will examine two case studies to determine the dependent variable: the 
nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Latin America.  The 
independent variables examined within each case study are: geo-strategic variables, host-
nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics.   
Chapter II describes Hizballah’s general fundraising needs and strategies and 
develops an analytical framework to help predict how and where terrorist organizations 
are likely to undertake fundraising operations.  The chapter shows that Hizballah needs a 
steady supply of financial resources to not only carry out armed actions against Israel but, 
perhaps more importantly, to increase its legitimacy and mitigate internal opposition to 
its growing participation in Lebanese politics.  Although the majority of these funding 
needs are met by assistance from state sponsors, Hizballah has traditionally pursued a 
variety of fundraising operations to diversify the sources of its funding and these 
operations are briefly described.  It is to be expected that Hizballah will choose from this 
repertoire of activities when carrying out fundraising operations in Latin America.    
The second half of Chapter II examines how geo-strategic variables, host-nation 
characteristics, and diaspora characteristics are likely to shape the particular fundraising 
operations a terrorist organization might employ in a particular area of the world.  To 
date, most studies have focused on how host-nation characteristics like weak government 
institutions and widespread corruption create hospitable environments for terrorist 
operations; these are undoubtedly important and are included in the framework.  
However, the large number of countries not typically identified as having these 
characteristics but which can nevertheless be considered either a permissive or hospitable 
environment for terrorism highlights the importance of including other factors in the 
framework, such as geo-strategic variables and diaspora characteristics.  
                                                 
4 Terrence Lyons, “Globalization, Diasporas, and Conflict,” Institute for Conflict Analysis and 
Resolution, George Mason university, January 2004.   Available online at: 
http://www.intlstudies.ucsd.edu/iicas_research_papers/Globalization,%20Territoriality,%20and%20Conflic
t%20Conference/GlobalDiaCon.pdf, Accessed on 12/2/04. 
 5
Chapter III examines Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay according to 
the analytical framework established in Chapter II.  Paraguay scores high on all three sets 
of variables identified in the framework, thus it comes as no surprise that high levels of 
fundraising activities for Hizballah have been identified in the country.  Evidence shows 
that the fundraising operations most commonly used by Hizballah in Paraguay are money 
laundering, donations, extortion, and piracy.  Factors contributing to the nature of 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay are: weak political institutions, 
widespread government corruption, weak legal framework relating to terrorism and 
money laundering, geo-strategic proximity to the TBA’s free trade zone, and evidence of 
high levels of communal and ideological support for Hizballah from the Lebanese 
diaspora.  The nexus between Ciudad del Este’s Lebanese community and the free trade 
zone of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil facilitates money laundering and piracy 
operations.   
Chapter IV is important because it demonstrates how the geo-strategic variables, 
host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics in Ecuador shape the particular 
fundraising operations Hizballah uses in that environment.  Ecuador’s host-nation and 
geo-strategic characteristics are consistent with those seen in Paraguay.  As a result, 
Ecuador appears to present as favorable an environment to terrorist fundraising 
operations as Paraguay does.  However, the small size of Ecuador’s Lebanese Islamic 
population, relative to Ecuador’s Lebanese Christian population and Paraguay’s Lebanese 
Islamic population, seemingly creates an unfavorable environment for Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations.  As a result of low levels of communal and ideological support 
from Hizballah from the Lebanese diaspora, fundraising operations most commonly used 
by Hizballah in Ecuador are money laundering and drug trafficking rather than donations 
or extortion.  Factors contributing to the nature of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in 
Ecuador are: weak political institutions, widespread government corruption, and the geo-
strategic proximity to the FARC-controlled drug trafficking zone.  Ecuador’s proximity 
to Colombia’s drug trafficking zone in the FARC-controlled territory facilitates money 
laundering and drug trafficking operations.    
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The nature of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Ecuador- with a diaspora that 
does not appear to possess the religious characteristics seemingly required to facilitate 
fundraising operations has significant implications for the future identification of 
permissive threat environments. The lack of evidence documenting any significant 
amount of donations made by Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora to Hizballah-linked 
organizations in Lebanon reflects the diaspora’s lack of a shared religion, which in turn 
likely indicates low levels of communal support for Hizballah.  As previously mentioned, 
the small size of the Lebanese diaspora’s Islamic population (relative to the size of its 
Christian population) indicates a low potential for ideological support within the 
diaspora.  However, the recent increase in the Islamic presence in Ecuador, demonstrated 
by the emergence of mosques that espouse radical Islamic rhetoric consistent with that 
used by Hizballah to legitimize its violence, is evidence that Hizballah is attempting to 
increase its ideological support within Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora.  The levels of 
communal and ideological support evident in Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora clearly 
influence Hizballah’s fundraising operations in the country.  However, Hizballah’s 
relationship with influential Lebanese businessmen in the region appears to be a more 
significant contributing factor to the nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations in Ecuador than either communal or ideological support.   
Chapter V is the conclusion.  This focus of this chapter is on the comparative 
analysis of how the independent variables in each case study determine the nature and 
significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  The nature and significance of 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay are largely a result of favorable geo-
strategic variables, host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics.  Predictably 
then, a wide range of fundraising operations is employed by Hizballah in Paraguay that 
result in a large volume of financial profits.  In Ecuador as well, geo-strategic variables 
and host-nation characteristics are favorable to fundraising operations.  However, the less 
than ideal characteristics of Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora explain Hizballah’ s 
fundraising operations in that country.  Hizballah’s use of money laundering and drug 
trafficking for fundraising capitalizes on favorable host-nation characteristics and geo-
strategic variables and is not overly dependent on either communal or ideological support 
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from the diaspora.  Finally, this chapter will briefly recommend areas for future research 
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II. HIZBALLAH: IN SEARCH OF A CAUSE        
This chapter describes how Hizballah’s evolution from an ideological armed 
resistance movement to an active participant in Lebanon’s political system resulted in an 
organizational need for financial resources and develops an analytical framework to 
determine how and where terrorist organizations conduct fundraising operations.  This 
transformation process began in 1992 with Hizballah’s decision to participate in 
Lebanon’s parliamentary elections and culminated in 2000 with Israel’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon.  Section A of this chapter describes Hizballah’s need for a steady supply of 
financial resources to continue its extensive amount of social service programs in 
Lebanon.  A central goal of Hizballah’s social services is to increase its legitimacy and 
mitigate internal opposition to its growing participation in Lebanese politics.   
Section B of this chapter examines how Hizballah has traditionally developed 
international financial support networks independent of its state sponsors despite the fact 
that it receives significant amounts of financial support from state sponsors.  This section 
identifies a comprehensive menu of options available to terrorist organizations for 
fundraising operations.  As described in Chapter I, the specific fundraising options 
utilized by Hizballah in Latin America will be analyzed in Paraguay and Ecuador.  The 
collective body of literature on terrorist fundraising operations identifies the following as 
common means by which terrorist organizations generate required funds: money 
laundering, remittances, donations to charities, extortion, piracy, drug trafficking, 
document falsification, kidnapping, robbery, arms trafficking, blackmail, smuggling, and 
counterfeiting.5    
Section C of this chapter examines how the independent variables of the thesis- 
geo-strategic variables, host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics will 
influence which fundraising options Hizballah are likely to employ.  This analytical 
framework will provide useful insights into understanding how the fundraising operations                                                  
5 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND, 2001. p. 42, LaVerle Berry, Glenn Curtis, John Gibbs, 
Rex Hudson, Tara Karacan, Nina Kollars, and Ramon Miro, “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and 
Terrorism.” Library of Congress Report, October 2003. p. 177, and Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and organized 
Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America.”  Library of Congress Report, July 2003. p. 
9. 
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conducted in any environment are a function of the specific characteristics of that 
environment.                      
A. HIZBALLAH’S NEED FOR FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS AND WHY 
THIS NEED EXISTS 
The central theme under which the above mentioned relationships exists is 
Hizballah’s transformation from its establishment in 1982 as an armed resistance 
movement to its current form and function as a legitimate political, military, and social 
institution.  The analysis of this transformation process focuses primarily on the internal 
politics of Hizballah and assumes that terrorist organizations become self-sustaining 
regardless of political consequences.6  Therefore, according to Crenshaw’s 
organizational process theory, a fundamental purpose of Hizballah is to ensure its own 
survival vis-à-vis changing real world dynamics.7  This transformation is evident in the 
balance Hizballah has created between its original ideological goals, as established in its 
1985 political platform, and its recent (1992 to present) emerging reliance on more 
pragmatic political goals required to provide the legitimacy necessary to sustain the 
organization.8  The decision to have Hizballah candidates run for office in Lebanon’s 
1992 parliamentary election demonstrates the organization’s pragmatism, indicates its 
willingness to compromise its strategic goals,9 and marks the beginning of the 
organization’s transition from an ideological armed resistance movement.  This evolution 
culminated with Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000.  Israel’s withdrawal from 
Lebanon created a fundamental dilemma for Hizballah by validating the legitimacy of the 
organization’s ideological goals and its tactical operations toward their achievement 
while simultaneously removing the organization’s primary cause and undercutting a 
significant portion of its fundamental ideological motivation.10   
                                                 
6 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” in Inside 
Terrorist Organizations, edited by David C. Rapoport, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988. 
7 Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” Orbis, Vol. 
29, No. 3, Fall 1985. 
8 Magnus Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebonization Process’,” 
Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 3, No. 1, Summer 1998.  pp. 3-4. 
9 Augustus R. Norton, “Hizballah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism,” Middle East Policy, Vol. V, No. 
4, January 1998. 
10 Ibid. 
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This fundamental change in roles and sources of legitimacy resulted in two 
significant implications for the role of Hizballah’s social service programs.  As 
Hizballah’s main motivation for its armed resistance was removed, the pragmatic 
rationale for its continued existence- social services and political representation, gained in 
relative importance.  Additionally, assuming that the sources and quantity of funding 
(internal and external) remained constant, the sudden lack of a practical reason for armed 
resistance in southern Lebanon would free additional resources for social service 
programs- having the immediate consequence of further bolstering their importance 
relative to the organization’s yet undefined ideology-based strategy.  The increased 
importance of Hizballah’s social service programs to its legitimization and overall 
organizational survival establishes the importance of fundraising operations.   
Since Israel’s withdrawal from Lebanon, Hizballah’s leadership has utilized the 
ideological rhetoric of armed deterrence against future Israeli aggression and support for 
Palestine in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to counterbalance any potential perception that 
its increased presence in Lebanon’s political system deteriorates its revolutionary 
character with its domestic and international constituency.11  The opposition to the 
participation in Lebanese politics initially came from within Hizballah’s radical elements 
and eventually translated into independent acts of violence against Israel in an attempt to 
undermine Nasrallah’s leadership.12  The assumption made to validate the relationship 
between ideology and legitimacy is that Lebanese diasporas are more likely to support 
the ideological goals of Hizballah’s armed resistance role than the political goals of its 
parliamentary representatives.   It is important to note that this ideological campaign has 
been conducted simultaneously with the increased importance of the network of social 
service projects.  While each is intended to influence different segments of Hizballah’s 
audience: the increased importance of the social service programs is designed to target 
the “hearts and minds” of the common man, while the ideological rhetorical campaign is 
designed to target members of the radical constituency, their parallel paths ultimately 
                                                 
11 “Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause?,” Middle East Breifing, International Crisis Group, 30 July 
2003, Augustus R. Norton, “Hizballah: From Radicalism to Pragmatism,” and Ely Karman, “Fight on All 
Fronts: Hizballah, the War on Terror, and the War in Iraq,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 
Policy Focus, No. 46, December 2003.   
12 Magnus Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebonization Process.’” 
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facilitate the achievement of common strategic goals- increasing legitimacy and the profit 
potential for future fundraising operations. 
B. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS SEPARATE 
FROM STATE SPONSORS  
The need for financial resources to support social service programs combined 
with a desire to be more self-reliant resulted in the early establishment of fundraising 
operations separate from state sponsorship, like zakat- that utilizes common religious 
beliefs (ideology) to garner financial resources.  An organizational goal to increase self-
reliance led Hizballah to seek alternate sources of funding.  The geo-strategic variables, 
host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics of areas in Latin America 
provided a potential source for an independent source of required funding.  However, 
despite the development of separate sources of funding, the maintenance of the 
substantial amount of financial support Hizballah receives from Iran is an integral part of 
its ability to sustain its legitimacy with its constituency in Lebanon.13  It appears logical 
that Hizballah’s fundraising operations (through ideology linked procedures like zakat or 
fundraising operations within diasporas) can be attributed to an organizational motivation 
to increase the diversity of sources of its funding.  The recognition that multiple causal 
relationships support the rationale behind Hizballah’s use of fundraising operations in 
Latin America reinforces the argument that, although state support is vital to Hizballah’s 
operations and its maintenance is important, financial self-sufficiency is a goal of 
organizational survival. 
The importance of fundraising operations to Hizballah’s ability to balance conflict 
between ideology and pragmatism reinforces the concept that the organization’s 
operations and public statements are simultaneously directed toward internal and external 
audiences.14   Although the level of restraint imposed by these individual factors is likely 
to fluctuate according to continuously shifting international and domestic dynamics, an 
important theme remains constant: that Hizballah’s heavy reliance on social service 
programs to increase its legitimacy in the face of opposition to its participation in 
                                                 
13 Magnus Ranstorp, “The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah’s Current ‘Lebonization Process’,” p. 21. 
14 Ibid. 
 13
Lebanon’s political system depends on a steady (or progressively increasing) influx of 
financial resources.   
While funding from international state sponsors like Iran is vital to Hizballah’s 
legitimization efforts, growing international pressure associated with the U.S.-led GWOT 
is likely to have either decreased the levels of overt state financial sponsorship of terrorist 
organizations or will decrease them in the future.*  Libya’s recent cooperation with the 
U.S. in the GWOT is evidence that coercive efforts to deter state-sponsored terrorism can 
result in substantial influence and reduce the overall availability of resources required by 
terrorist organizations.  Libya’s recent policy reversal and support for U.S. counter-
terrorism policy is significant considering the inability of previous U.S. coercive efforts 
(military and economic sanctions) to effectively deter its sponsorship of terrorism.  Libya 
and Iran are vastly different countries with correspondingly different sensitivities to 
coercive techniques.  While it cannot be assumed that techniques used to successfully 
coerce Libya will have any coercive influence on Iran, the trend suggests that, under the 
dynamics of the GWOT, Iran and other state sponsors of terrorism may be vulnerable to 
coercive diplomacy in ways they have not been in the past.  A climate of decreased 
resources from international sponsors will be the likely result of the GWOT.  Therefore 
in the future, Hizballah will likely be required to increasingly seek to satisfy its own 
growing need for financial resources with its own fundraising operations.  
Money laundering, remittances, donations to charities, extortion, piracy, drug 
trafficking, document falsification, kidnapping, robbery, arms trafficking, blackmail, 
smuggling, and counterfeiting are identified as common means by which terrorist 
organizations generate required funds.15   While the specific techniques available for 
terrorist financing are clear, the secretive nature of their application in the real world 
                                                 
* Due to the secretive nature of state support and the resultant ambiguity of the quantitative analysis 
associated with it, it is not surprising that there is not yet any direct evidence indicating a decreased level of 
state support for Hizballah as a result of the GWOT. 
15 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND, 2001. p. 42, LaVerle Berry, Glenn Curtis, John Gibbs, 
Rex Hudson, Tara Karacan, Nina Kollars, and Ramon Miro, “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and 
Terrorism.” Library of Congress Report, October 2003. p. 177, and Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and organized 
Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America.”  Library of Congress Report, July 2003. p. 
9. 
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often prevents any substantive analysis.16  The covert nature of applied fundraising 
techniques often use pre-existing and legitimate economic infrastructures and 
transactions to disguise their intended purposes.  The particular technique used by 
terrorist organizations to conduct fundraising operations will likely depend on the 
specific characteristics of the environment in which they operate.  This same body of 
academic and policy-based literature also identifies common environmental 
characteristics that facilitate terrorist fundraising operations.17  The extent these 
favorable environmental characteristics exist in Latin America will be described in 
section four of this chapter.  However, a list of fundraising techniques commonly used 
terrorists in Latin America is provided in Table 1.  
Table 1. Fundraising Techniques (From Ref 18 )   
Generic list of fundraising techniques available 
to terrorist organizations. 
Techniques used by Hizballah for fundraising 
in Latin America (Paraguay and Ecuador). 
 Money laundering 





 Drug trafficking 
 Counterfeiting 
 Document falsification 
 Kidnapping 
 Robbery 
 Arms trafficking 
 Blackmail 
 Money laundering 




 Drug trafficking 
 Smuggling 
                                                 
16 A large percentage of the analysis on terrorist fundraising operations in Latin America is focused on 
the TBA.  Additionally, these reports all reference the same sources of information- much of which 
describes actions in the mid to late-1990s.  The lack of comprehensive evidence on terrorist fundraising 
operations is an understandable consequence of the covert nature of its application.        
17 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND, 2001. p. 42, LaVerle Berry, Glenn Curtis, John Gibbs, 
Rex Hudson, Tara Karacan, Nina Kollars, and Ramon Miro, “Nations Hospitable to Organized Crime and 
Terrorism.” Library of Congress Report, October 2003. p. 177, and Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and organized 
Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South America.” Library of Congress Report, July 2003. p. 
9. 
18 John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’- Financing the Provisional IRA: Part I,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 11:2 (Summer 1999).  Available online at: 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/hoj05/hoj05.pdf, Accessed on 12/4/04.  While kidnapping for ransom, 
blackmail, and armed robbery are options certainly available to terrorist organizations, this analysis is 
focused on fundraising operations that meet a higher level of sophistication and concealment. 
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If a terrorist organization is able to appeal to the radical religious ideology of a 
diaspora (or if it’s able to foster ideological support where it previously did not exist) it 
will likely increase the foundation of ideological support it receives from that community 
and thus increase the profit potential for its fundraising operations.  This relationship 
establishes the likelihood that Hizballah will promote radical Islam in Latin America.  
This relationship is significant because while religious ideology is not commonly 
considered a direct technique of terrorist fundraising, the promotion of religious ideology 
consistent with Hizballah’s radical ideology can facilitate the creation of environmental 
characteristics that are likely to increase the profitability of fundraising operations.     
C. THE INFLUENCE OF GEO-STRATEGIC VARIABLES, HOST-NATION 
CHARACTERISTICS, AND DIASPORA CHARACTERISTICS ON 
FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS 
The specific identification of diasporas as strategically valuable to terrorist 
operations results in several important policy implications for their treatment by host-
nations determined to combat terrorist operations.  This requires and examination of why 
and how diasporas support terrorists. 
Using characteristics of Lebanese diasporas as primary indicators of the existence 
of permissive threat environments requires a detailed understanding of exactly which 
characteristics of the diaspora should be targeted to effectively identify environments 
conducive to fundraising operations.  As previously mentioned, diasporas are commonly 
motivated to support terrorist organizations for communal or ideological reasons.19  As a 
result, some mechanism of measurement must be developed and applied to each in order 
to determine which is more influential.  The tactics used for fundraising from a diaspora 
may indicate the relative power relationship that exists between the communal or 
ideological motivations for support.  Evidence of a large amount of donations by 
diasporas to Hizballah-linked social organizations or of large amounts of donations sent 
to organizations and individuals in Lebanon is likely indicative of a strong communal 
motivation within the diaspora.  An important distinction must be made regarding the 
nature of this relationship: the existence of communal motivation does not depend on 
                                                 
19 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. RAND, 2001. 
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whether the donations made to Hizballah-linked organizations or individuals.  However, 
evidence of Hizballah’s extensive use of extortion is likely indicative of weak communal 
support.  Additionally, levels of communal support will fluctuate with perceptions the 
effectiveness of Hizballah.  This relationship, otherwise known as the “bandwagon 
effect,”20 appears to be linked to ideological motivations for support.   
An example of this link is Hizballah’s use of diaspora members with shared 
ideological perspectives to gather information on Israeli targets in Argentina.  This 
information was used in attacks against these targets in 1992 and 1994.21  These attacks 
were then used as examples of Hizballah’s success- and theoretically increased levels of 
communal support within the diaspora.22  Evidence of Islamic mosques espousing 
ideological beliefs consistent with Hizballah’s radical ideology is likely indicative of 
ideological support within the diaspora.  Evidence linking these mosques to Hizballah 
operatives within the diaspora indicates a substantially increased level of ideological 
support- unless however, these operatives received funding for the development and 
maintenance of the mosques from external sources or the mosques received little support 
from diaspora members.  Additionally, changing characteristics of the diaspora’s 
religious composition, not otherwise explained by the host-nation’s domestic level 
dynamics, is likely indicative of ideological support within the diaspora (when these 
religious changes are consistent with Hizballah’s use of Islam to legitimize its actions).   
Hizballah’s regional tactics reflect the organization’s increasing reliance on 
ideology-based rhetoric to counterbalance any perceived loss of legitimacy resulting from 
its increased participation in Lebanese politics.  This relationship appears to have 
influenced the emergence of Islamic mosques in Paraguay and Ecuador.  The 
development of mosques in Paraguay may be partially explained by the religious 
composition of Paraguay’s Lebanese diaspora.  However, the religious composition of 
Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora was not consistent with the establishment of mosques.  
                                                 
20 Ibid. 
21Mario Daniel Montoya, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, No. 12, December 2001, pp. 13-14.     
22Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. p. 52.     
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Therefore, Hizballah’s attempt to develop an ideological support base in Ecuador must be 
a suspected reason for the creation of mosques in a predominantly Christian diaspora 
absent compelling evidence that domestic dynamics in Ecuador were responsible.  
Evidence that many of these mosques are linked to Hizballah or espouse Islamic 
fundamentalist rhetoric, consistent with the organization’s ideology, further suggests the 
existence of strategically significant legitimacy-bolstering operations.  Religion- 
interpreted from sacred texts and communicated by clerical leaders who claim to 
represent the divine, becomes a tool used by Hizballah to legitimize its strategy and 
tactics.23   
However, when changes in a diaspora’s religious composition can be explained 
by external dynamics, like migration patterns, it is crucial to determine the group’s initial 
motivation to migrate.  The degree of connection a diaspora community has with a 
terrorist organization involved in a struggle related to the group’s “homeland” is often 
related to whether the migration was motivated by violent conflict or perceived 
oppression, or economic need or opportunity.24  Diaspora members whose migration was 
motivated by violent conflict or a perceived oppression would likely produce higher 
levels of ideological support for Hizballah than those whose migration was motivated by 
economic need or opportunity.25  The concept linking diasporas to violent conflict is 
supported by studies of diaspora influences on the length and reasons for civil wars.26  In 
the analysis of the relationship between diasporas and civil wars, Collier and Hoeffler 
determine that a direct relationship exists between the degree of sympathy diasporas have 
for a civil war and whether the conflict was motivated by greed or grievance.  Grievance 
                                                 
23 Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998) p. 94.   
24 Terrence Lyons, “Globalization, Diasporas, and Conflict ,” Institute for Conflict Analysis and 
Resolution, George Mason university, January 2004.   Available online at: 
http://www.intlstudies.ucsd.edu/iicas_research_papers/Globalization,%20Territoriality,%20and%20Conflic
t%20Conference/GlobalDiaCon.pdf, Accessed on 12/2/04. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” a policy paper prepared for 
the World Bank in March 2002.  pp. 25-26.   Available online at: http://128.8.56.108/iris-
data/docs/ppc_ideas/conflict_frameworks/collier_hoeffler.pdf, Accessed on 12/3/04.  
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evokes more substantial levels of sympathy and support from diasporas than greed, and 
results in more prolonged civil wars.27               
Another characteristic of diasporas that influences the nature and significance of 
fundraising efforts are geo-strategic variables.  The analysis of geo-strategic variables is 
focused an environment’s proximity to free trade or drug trafficking zones.  The 
combination of these characteristics often provides the economic infrastructure and 
sufficient profit potential necessary for successful fundraising operations.  The existence 
of a well-developed financial infrastructure and influential businessmen (that are 
sympathetic to Hizballah’s ideology) within the diaspora significantly increases the 
environment’s profit potential.  Available evidence suggests that the involvement of 
Lebanese businessmen in Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Latin America is 
common.  However, evidence to determine if these businessmen participate in these 
terrorist fundraising operations because they are sympathetic to Hizballah or for greed is 
unavailable.          
The relative importance of each of these characteristics on the nature and 
significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Latin America will depend on the 
specific characteristics of the respective host-nation.  The characteristics of host-nations 
that facilitate Hizballah’s fundraising operations will be referred to as permissive threat 
environments.  Hizballah’s strategic shift from an ideological armed resistance movement 
to an active participant in Lebanon’s political system is consistent with a relative 
decrease in the importance of communal support vis-à-vis both ideological support and 
the presence of influential businessmen.  Consequently, the variables that most 
effectively influence the creation of permissive threat environments are ideological 
support for terrorist organizations, the existence of influential businessmen within the 
diaspora (who share the terrorist’s ideology), and the proximity to high profit-potential 
economic environments.   
The term permissive threat environment has a wide variety of definitions, often 
based on divergent concepts of the causal relationships between environmental 
characteristics and threat levels.  The definition of permissive threat environment used in 
                                                 
27 Ibid, pp. 3-5. 
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this chapter is a significant modification of the definition of “hospitable” nations 
provided by the 2003 Library of Congress (LOC) Report: Nations Hospitable to 
Organized Crime and Terrorist Organizations.  While this definition is based primarily 
on domestic-level characteristics, it also includes significant geographic characteristics 
that have potential strategic value for terrorist operations.28  As defined by the LOC, the 
main elements that make a nation “hospitable” to terrorist operations are “official 
corruption, incomplete or weak legislation, poor enforcement of existing laws, non-
transparent financial institutions, unfavorable economic conditions, lack of respect for the 
rule of law in society, and poorly guarded national borders.”29   
For the purposes of this analysis, permissive threat environments are defined by 
their possession of the following characteristics: weak political institutions, widespread 
government corruption, weak legal framework relating to terrorism and money 
laundering, prominent Lebanese diasporas, geo-strategic location (proximity to 
established drug trafficking or free trade zones), and evidence of communal or 
ideological support for Hizballah from Lebanese diasporas.  These characteristics are 
represented in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Characteristics of Permissive Threat Environments. 
 
 
Permissive Threat Environments (include both geo-strategic variables and Diaspora 
characteristics). 
 Weak political institutions 
 Widespread government corruption 
 Weak legal framework 
 Prominent Lebanese Diasporas (Lebanese businessmen) 
 Geo-strategic location (high profit-potential economic environments) 
 Communal support of Diaspora 
 Ideological support of Diaspora  
 
While the relatively broad definition of permissive threat environments and its 
potential applicability to a large number of nations threatens to decrease its practical 
utility, its efficacy relative to Hizballah operations is increased by the application of the 
                                                 




established link between the ideology of terrorist organizations and their perceived range 
of legitimate options for operations.30  According to Drake, the ideology of a terrorist 
organization shapes its world outlook, determines the range of potential options they 
view as legitimate, defines how they judge the utility of institutions, and directly 
influences their targeting patterns.  Although Drake’s theory describing the influence of 
ideology was developed to explain patterns in the decision-making processes resulting in 
the target selection of terrorist organizations, it is also applicable to a terrorist 
organization’s decision-making processes relating to all other decisions in general.  As a 
result, Hizballah’s ideology predisposes the organization to seek support where they 
perceive the potential exists for communities to have religious beliefs that are consistent 
with their strategic goals.   
The specific link between the influence of ideology (as described by Drake) and 
Hizballah’s selection of permissive threat environments, in which to conduct fundraising 
operations, is the organization’s identification of influential Lebanese diasporas that 
potentially provide Hizballah with sufficient levels of communal or ideological support to 
facilitate its fundraising operations.  This theory is based on the assumption that 
Hizballah’s ideology influences its worldview and predisposes the organization to 
identify Lebanese diasporas as a significant characteristic of a permissive threat 
environment.  The applicability of the link between Lebanese diasporas and permissive 
threat environments depends on the assumption that Hizballah is capable of identifying 
and quantitatively measuring, according to some rational system of value assignment, the 
potential for communal or ideological support they would likely receive from a Lebanese 
diaspora.  
The relationship between ideology and Hizballah’s identification of Lebanese 
diasporas for fundraising operations is strengthened by the nature of the organization’s 
traditional use of religious ideology to legitimize the violence of its actions.  Hizballah’s 
use of ideology to legitimize its actions is significant because it clarifies the differences in 
the intended utility of diasporas depending on the nature of the organization relying on 
that diaspora.  After all, immigrant communities often rely on compatriots for assistance 
                                                 
30 C. J. M. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” Terrorism and Political 
Violence Vol. 10 No.2, Summer 1998. 
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and drug-trafficking networks are routinely established according to ethnic ties.  The use 
of ideology to legitimize actions distinguishes Hizballah from common criminal 
organizations- like international drug-trafficking organizations, whose primary 
motivations are financial.  The connection between ideology and legitimacy is central to 
Hizballah’s attraction to Lebanese diasporas and differentiates the terrorist-diaspora 
dynamic from the criminal-diaspora dynamic.  
Weak government institutions and widespread corruption are factors contributing 
to the creation of permissive threat environments.  However, the large number of 
countries not typically identified as having theses characteristics but which can 
nevertheless be considered either a threatening or hospitable environment for terrorist 
operations highlights the importance of the existence of influential diasporas and geo-
strategic characteristics in the identification of such environments.  Canada and several 
Western European countries considered leaders of the European Union (EU), like France, 
Germany, and the United Kingdom, are not generally associated with having either weak 
government institutions or widespread corruption.31  However, each is identified by the 
LOC as being “hospitable” for terrorist operations.32  While Canada and the above 
mentioned prominent EU-member nations have substantial diaspora communities, their 
attractiveness to terrorist organizations appears to result from a combination of their 
sophisticated financial institutions and their proximity to strategic geographic 
locations.33  In theory, capable government institutions in Canada or EU-member nations 
make the operations of terrorist organizations more difficult relative to terrorist 
operations in nations with weak institutions or widespread corruption.  In practice 
however, their sophisticated financial institutions and proximity to well established 
financial markets increase the relative profitability of terrorist or criminal operations.  
According to a 2001 study, the price per kilogram of cocaine rises from US$2,000 at its 
point of origin in Colombia to US$22,500 in Spain and to US$42,000 in the United 
                                                 
31 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2003.  Available online at:   
http://transparency.org/pressreleases_archive/2003/2003.10.07.cpi.en.html,  Accessed on 10/31/04. 




Kingdom.34  The economic modernity of Canada and Western Europe provides similar 
incentives to terrorists and legitimate businessmen.  According to arms trafficking expert 
Paul Eavis, “As crime becomes more ‘business-like,’ it not only becomes more difficult 
to detect, but criminal groups also profit from many of the conditions and systems 
established to facilitate legal business, including the Internet and e-commerce 
channels.”35  The identification of a mutually beneficial relationship existing between 
terrorists, criminals, and businessmen and threat environments in which they operate 
reinforces the influential roles Lebanese businessmen play in Hizballah’s operations 
within Ecuador and Paraguay.  The identification of characteristics of Lebanese diasporas 
and geo-strategic variables as important contributing factors in the creation of permissive 
threat environments is a significant departure from the LOC’s definition of “hospitable” 
environments and directly supports the importance of this chapter’s definition of 
permissive threat environments.  While the strength of government institutions and the 
degree of corruption remain important factors contributing to the creation of permissive 
threat environments, the description of threat environments in Canada and Western 
Europe illustrate how the characteristics of diasporas and geo-strategic variables are more 
significant contributing factors.      
Although an accurate identification of Hizballah’s value assignment process is 
speculative at best, several general characteristics of Lebanese diasporas are likely to be 
consistent with their identification as having potentially adequate levels of communal or 
ideological support for Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  While this list is not intended 
to be comprehensive, it will somewhat reduce the sample size of attractive Lebanese 
diasporas.  A Lebanese diaspora will likely be attractive for Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations if it consists of a large enough population to conceal illegal operations and is 
strategically located to support illegal operations.        
The following case studies describing Hizballah operations in Paraguay and 
Ecuador are important because they illustrate how a common strategy applied to 
                                                 
34 Christopher Aaron, “Globalisation and Organized Crime,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 December 
2001. 
35 Paul Eavis, “The Hidden Security Threat: Transnational Organized Criminal Activity,” RUSI 
Journal, 146, no. 6, December 2001. 
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permissive threat environments with variations in the composition of their defining 
characteristics can result in different organizational tactics for fundraising operations.  
While Paraguay and Ecuador share many common characteristics defining permissive 
threat environments, the difference in the religious demographics of each Lebanese 
diaspora provides valuable insights into the utility of ideology-based rhetoric and 
demonstrates the latent potential for future support held by otherwise seemingly benign 
diasporas.  The implications of seemingly benign diasporas having latent potential must 
be reconciled with the demonstrated need to focus counter-terrorism attention on 
diasporas.  The success of any such reconciliation process will depend on the 
effectiveness of policies implemented to regulate government-diaspora relations.  
However, this subject is beyond the scope of this chapter and will be addressed in 
Chapter V.  The Paraguayan case study is important because it represents the epitome of 
a permissive threat environment and serves as a valuable comparative reference for the 
Ecuadorian case study.  The Ecuadorian case study is important because it demonstrates 
how an environment with less than ideal characteristics, as compared to those evident in 
Paraguay, can have significant strategic value given the application of appropriate tactics.   
 Table 3 provides a useful guide by which to analyze how the characteristics of 
any particular environment can be used to determine the fundraising operations that are 
likely to be employed there.  This table simply combines the menu of options available 
for fundraising (Table 1) with the defining characteristics of a permissive threat 
environment (Table 2).  Characteristics of permissive threat environments are listed along 
the vertical axis and the menu of options available for fundraising operations are listed 
along the horizontal axis.  Environmental characteristics favorable to a particular 
fundraising operation will be indicated with an X at the point of intersection on the table.  
This table represents how geo-strategic variables, host-nation characteristics, and 
diaspora characteristics will likely determine how and where terrorist organizations 
conduct fundraising operations.  Variations of this table will be used in the analysis of 
Paraguay and Ecuador to link the environmental characteristics of each case with the 
fundraising operations employed by Hizballah.  Instances when particular fundraising 
options are linked with multiple environmental characteristics do not indicate any ranking 
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of influence among the characteristics.  Additionally, because no two environments are 
identical, the characteristics of permissive threat environments applicable will vary 
according to the particular environment analyzed.      
Table 3.  Environmental Characteristics and Fundraising Techniques 
  
 
Characteristics of Permissive 
Threat Environments 
(Tailor to specific environment) 
 
               M
oney Laundering 
               D
onations 





















Weak political institutions 
X X X X X 
Widespread government 
corruption X X X X X 
Weak laws (relating to 
terrorism and money 
laundering) X X X 
X X 
Influential Lebanese Diasporas 
X 
Geo-strategic location (near 
high profit-potential economic 
environments) X X X X 
X 
Communal support from 
Diaspora X 
Ideological support from 





III. HIZBALLAH’S FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS IN 
PARAGUAY 
The organization of this chapter is intended to progress from a general description 
of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay to a detailed explanation of how the 
nature and significance of these fundraising operations are shaped by geo-strategic 
variables, host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics.  The chapter is divided 
into four sections: a description of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay, a 
description of the Lebanese diaspora and how its characteristics shape Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations, a description of significant geo-strategic variables and how they 
shape Hizballah’s fundraising operations, and a description of host-nation characteristics 
that are conducive to Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  The information presented in 
this chapter will validate the analytical framework developed in Chapter II to help 
identify where and how Hizballah carries out fundraising operations in Latin America.  
The sizeable scope and magnitude of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay are 
facilitated by the country’s favorable geo-strategic variables, host-nation characteristics, 
and diaspora characteristics.    
A.  HIZBALLAH’S FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS 
The ideological and political aspects of Hizballah’s strategic goals have always 
been relatively balanced.  Israel’s withdrawal from southern Lebanon in 2000 deprived 
Hizballah of its primary reason for armed resistance and resulted in a shift in tactical 
operations from armed resistance to deterrence.  This tactical shift is illustrated by 
Hizballah’s rhetorical support for Palestine and its commitment to the deterrence of 
future Israeli aggression in Lebanon.36  Although the U.S. invasion of Iraq creates a new 
regional balance of power that can potentially be used by Hizballah for momentum to 
continue its original cause for armed resistance, recent rhetoric and evidence is consistent 
with the strategic shift away from armed resistance and toward political deterrence.37  
For example, Hizballah’s stance toward Israel and southern Lebanon has shifted from 
                                                 




armed resistance to deterrence.  Hizballah spokesman, Hassan Izz ad-Din is quoted as 
saying:  
Israeli Prime Minister Sharon knows that an attack on 
Lebanon is not an easy decision.  As for Hizballah, we have 
very developed capabilities.  We can’t prevent an attack but 
we can make it very difficult for the Israeli’s to achieve 
their goals.38    
The effectiveness of ideology as a motivational tool to cultivate solidarity and 
support from a constituency is demonstrated by Hizballah’s continued use of rhetorical 
statements consistent with its radical religious ideology to garner support, despite a clear 
strategic shift toward less-ideologically influenced political goals-like participation in 
Lebanon’s Parliament.  The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is similar to Hizballah in that it 
exploits the motivational potential of a common repressed religion (Catholicism) while 
fundamentally espousing a consistent political goal.  The IRA exploited the British 
government’s decision to institute internment of terror suspects in the 1970’s to increase 
its fundraising and political support from the Irish diaspora in the North Eastern United 
States.39            
The TBA of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay provides a hospitable environment 
for terrorist fundraising operations in Latin America.  The examination of Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations in Paraguay is representative of its operations throughout the TBA 
and validates the framework developed in Chapter II to the extent that the geo-strategic 
variables, host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics used in the framework 
are constant across each of the countries forming the TBA.  The evidence of Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations in Paraguay includes a substantial amount of donations to 
Hizballah-linked organizations, extortion of Lebanese businesses, illegal sales of 
contraband and pirated goods, and money laundering.   
Official Hizballah party operatives primarily coordinate with prominent Lebanese 
businessmen who are sympathetic to Hizballah’s radical ideology.  These Lebanese 
businessmen then coordinate various legal and illegal fundraising operations within the 
                                                 
38 Cited in The Daily Star, 20 March 2003. 
39 Paul Wilkinson. Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London: Frank Cass 
Publishers, 2000. pp. 34-36. 
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TBA.  The primary legal means for generating financial support for Hizballah are 
donations.  The primary illegal means for generating financial support for Hizballah are 
extortion, sales of contraband and pirated goods, and money laundering.  One of the 
likely strategic goals of highly visible acts of violence motivated by Hizballah’s ideology 
is an attempt to increase levels of ideological and/or communal support within the 
Lebanese diaspora, thereby potentially increasing the profit potential for its fundraising 
operations in other countries in Latin America.40  Hizballah operatives and Lebanese 
businessmen have been implicated in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos 
Aires and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association.41  These 
operations may have been intended, in part, to demonstrate the success of Hizballah’s 
ideology and propaganda to the Lebanese diaspora.    Even if these types of violent 
demonstrations consistently result in increased amounts of financial income from 
fundraising operations (evidence of this does not exist), they are not likely to be used 
extensively by terrorist organizations.  The increased international attention this level of 
violence produces would likely increase the overall costs of operations (in terms of 
increased counter-terrorist capability and decreased covertness for the terrorist 
organization) to a level outweighing any potential gains.  The ideological propaganda that 
accompanies any demonstration of Hizballah’s power is intended to exploit common 
religious beliefs among the Lebanese population in the TBA.   
There is evidence that a percentage of the Lebanese diaspora in Ciudad del Este 
identifies with radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology consistent with Hizballah’s 
rhetoric and ideology.  A letter to Lebanese businessman Assad Ahmad Barakat from 
Hizballah’s Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah thanking him for his financial 
contributions to El Martir obtained in an October 2001 police raid on one of Barakat’s 
many Ciudad del Este businesses indicates active fundraising operations by radical 
terrorists in the TBA.42  Since 1995, Barakat’s donations to Hizballah in Lebanon are 
                                                 
40 Daniel L. Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Roseneau, and David Brannan, Trends in 
Outside Support for Insurgent Movements. p. 52.    
41 Mario Daniel Montoya, “Israel Takes Special Interest in Triple Border Area,” Jane’s Intelligence 
Review, No. 12, December 2001, pp. 13-14.    
42 Blanca Madani, “Hezbollah’s Global Finance Network: The Triple Frontier.” Middle East 
Intelligence Bulletin, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 2002. p. 3.  
 28
estimated to be in excess of $50 million.43  Another significant link to radical Islamic 
fundamentalist ideology was discovered in February 2000, with the arrest of Lebanese 
businessman Ali Khalil Mehri in Ciudad del Este on software piracy charges.  The 
software Mehri distributed among the Arab population to raise money to support 
Hizballah contained interviews of suicide bombers (prior to their acts of terror) 
encouraging viewers to strike at U.S. and Israeli targets in Latin America.44  The 
example of Hizballah’s promotion of radical ideology within Paraguay’s Lebanese 
diaspora is significant for two reasons: one, if this software has enough resonance within 
the community to produce financial profits, then its level of ideological support for 
Hizballah must be at a sufficient level to facilitate fundraising operations; and two, the 
active promotion of radical ideology likely encourages or increases levels of ideological 
support where it otherwise would be low.        
The documented link between Assad Barakat and Hizballah Secretary General 
Hassan Nasrallah regarding Barakat’s financial contributions from the TBA demonstrates 
a modus operandi for Hizballah to interact with businessmen in Ciudad del Este’s 
Lebanese community.  Assad Barakat owns several legitimately registered businesses in 
the TBA, Chile, and the U.S. like Galleria Page (Ciudad del Este’s largest shopping 
mall); investigators believe these businesses are fronts used to funnel profits to 
Hizballah.45  Several of Barakat’s Ciudad del Este businesses are identified on the 2004 
U.S. Treasury Department’s (Office of Foreign Assets Control) Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons list as having links with Hizballah.46  Following the 
terrorist attacks in the U.S. on September 11, 2001, Barakat fled Ciudad del Este in 
response to international arrest warrants being issued indicting him on charges of 
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association for criminal purposes, abetment of crime, and tax evasion.47  Barakat was 
arrested in Brazil and extradited to Paraguay in 2002.48  Barakat has also been 
implicated in the 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires and the 1994 
bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association.49      
Sobhi Fayad, a business partner of Assad Barakat was arrested in November 2001 
on charges of tax evasion after bank statements retrieved by Paraguayan investigators in a 
raid on one of Barakat’s businesses revealed Fayad made significant financial transfers to 
Lebanon on nearly a daily basis.50  During the course of this investigation, it was 
revealed that Sobhi Fayad had not paid taxes since 1992.51  Seized documents indicate 
that, in 2000, Sobhi Fayad made contributions of more than $3.5 million to the Martyr 
Social Benefit Organization- a humanitarian organization in Lebanon that financially 
supports the orphans and families of Hizballah suicide bombers.52  Fayad’s significant 
influence within the Lebanese community in Ciudad del Este is indicated by his 
documented connections with the Lebanese ambassador in Paraguay, Hicham 
Hamdam.53   
Sobhi Fayad is also charged with running an extensive extortion operation to 
squeeze “donations” from Lebanese businessmen in Ciudad del Este.54  In a 2002 
interview with Jeffrey Goldberg (a journalist for the New Yorker), Muhammed Youssef 
Abdallah, a prominent religious official and owner of the Ciudad del Este Mosque of the 
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Prophet Mohammad, denies any connection with Hizballah but concedes that he and 
other Lebanese businessmen are expected to donate to the group.  Muhammed Youssef 
Abdallah is quoted as saying, “Five years ago, people were expected to give twenty 
percent of their income.”55  Lebanese businessmen being forced to pay protection money 
to Hizballah in the TBA is described in detail in a 1997 article by an Argentine 
reporter.56  The extent of these extortion operations is illustrated by the fact that the 
president of the Paraguayan Arab Chamber of Commerce, Armando Kassen, was charged 
with ordering the 1998 murder of a Ciudad del Este businessman who refused to pay the 
required tax/donation.57     
Paraguay’s thriving industry of pirated goods results from weak government 
support for enforcement measures, an obstructionist judiciary, and ineffective customs 
procedures.58  Ciudad del Este is the pre-eminent route into Latin America for 
counterfeit goods from Asia, with an estimated $1.5 billion worth of goods moving 
through the country annually.59  Paraguayan authorities arrested another Lebanese 
businessman, Ali Mehri, at Interpol’s request in Ciudad del Este in February 2000 on 
software piracy charges.60  Mehri exploited weak Paraguayan intellectual property rights 
laws in 1998 by registering the Play Station video game brand (that is owned by Sony).61  
He managed to escape prior to being questioned by Argentine authorities on suspicion of 
involvement in the bombings of Israeli targets in Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994.62  
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Paraguayan authorities claim that Mehri was responsible for the sale of millions of 
dollars worth of pirated software and CDs from shopping malls in Ciudad del Este and 
funneling the proceeds to Hizballah.  Piracy is a primary source of income for terrorist 
groups in the TBA.63  During the February 2000 raid on Mehri’s Ciudad del Este 
apartment, Paraguayan authorities discovered financial documents representing financial 
transactions from Mehri to terrorist organizations totaling more than $700,000.  
Additionally, authorities discovered pirated software and CDs containing radical Islamic 
propaganda.64   
According to the U.S. Department of State, Paraguay is a principal money-
laundering center in Latin America.65  As of 2000, an estimated $12 billion was being 
laundered in the TBA each year- $5 billion of which was being laundered out of 
Paraguay.66 
Because many Lebanese immigrants in Ciudad del Este maintain close ties with 
family in Lebanon and identify themselves with the political struggles of the Lebanese 
people, they routinely send money to political organizations in Lebanon (Hizballah is an 
official political party in Lebanon).67  The Paraguayan Interior Minister Julio Cesar 
Fanego said, when describing a joint U.S.-Paraguayan investigation of remittances made 
from the TBA to the Middle East between 1998 and 2001: "We verified the remittance of 
money [to terrorist groups].  I am almost sure that there are citizens linked to the 
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Hizballah on the Triborder area."68  Paraguay and the United States have confirmed that 
Arab communities in the TBA have made remittances of between $50 and $500 million 
to Islamic terrorist organizations in the Middle East from 1998 to 2001.69  According to 
the minister, most of the financial remittance transactions were for very small amounts of 
money (between $500 and $2000) and were made by numerous individuals in the 
Lebanese community.  While it was difficult to determine whether small magnitude 
financial transfers (between $500 and $2000) were intended to support charity or 
terrorism, large individual financial transfers from illegal financial activities strongly 
indicate the intent to support terrorism.  The Paraguayan Money Laundering Prevention 
Secretariat identified 45 people who made individual transactions of over $100,000 from 
the TBA to the Middle East between 1998 and 2001.70  While the identities of 
individuals on this list were kept secret, Angel Gabriel Gonzalez Caceres, the Paraguayan 
Bank Superintendent, acknowledged that a significant percentage of them were Lebanese 
businessmen.71 
The magnitude of the financial transfers generates significant distrust from 
Paraguayan and U.S. governments over the motivations of the Lebanese diaspora.  
Although the U.S. and Paraguayan governments recognize Hizballah as a terrorist 
organization, the group does provide a substantial amount of humanitarian services in 
Lebanon- which many Muslims feel obligated to support.  “Muslims have the religious 
duty of donating money to charity institutions, and the Hizballah works with poor 
children justifying money remittance operations," said Adrienne Senna, chairman of the 
Brazilian Financial Activities Oversight Council.  According to Ali Hussein, a Muslim 
who lives in Ciudad del Este, “A Muslim should give 20 percent of his income to charity, 
for poor children and unemployed Muslims… If I can help the Hizballah I do so, because 
the Hizballah has brought peace to Lebanon."72  This sense of a communal shared 
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experience and struggle between the Lebanese Diaspora in Ciudad del Este and Lebanon 
is reinforced by religious teachings promoting support for charity.  The dual operations of 
Hizballah (terror and charity) make the motivations of individual sources of donations 
somewhat unclear.  However, the sense of communal support within the Lebanese 
diaspora in Ciudad del Este is evident regardless of whether the motivations of individual 
Lebanese supporters are humane or sinister.  Table 4 lists the fundraising operations used 
by Hizballah in Paraguay. 
Table 4.  Hizballah’s Fundraising Techniques in Paraguay  
Techniques used by Hizballah for fundraising in 
Paraguay. 






B. PARAGUAY’S LEBANESE DIASPORA  
Paraguay had a large influx of Lebanese and other Middle East nationals about 60 
years ago, and it formally accepts a small number of naturalized citizens from Arab 
countries each year.  As a result of the region’s ideal geographic and economic 
characteristics, the heterogeneous population of the TBA increased from 60,000 in 1971 
to more than 700,000 in 2001.73  The ideal geographic conditions resulted from the 
Iguazu Falls and the ideal economic conditions resulted from the establishment of a free 
trade zone in Ciudad del Este.  This free trade zone was established in an attempt to 
harness the tourist and energy-production potential of the Iguazu Falls.74  By 2001, the 
region’s population included 23,000 Lebanese-Arabs.75  Many of the Lebanese migrated 
to Paraguay due to the civil war in Lebanon in the 1970’s.76  The Lebanese community 
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in Paraguay shares a common foundation of religious beliefs (Islam) and cultural 
experiences (Lebanese Civil War).   
The Lebanese community in Paraguay has the necessary infrastructure to control 
its own cultural, commercial, educational, and social activities.  The large Arab 
population in Ciudad del Este and its uniform religious composition facilitates the 
conduct of fundraising operations by Islamic terrorist organizations.  Of the estimated 
20,000 to 30,000 Arab immigrants living in the TBA (mainly in the cities of Ciudad del 
Este and Foz do Iguacu), the Lebanese account for 90% of the Arab population in Ciudad 
del Este.77  Considering the general lack of immigration control and accountability (from 
the governments of Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina) in the TBA, the size of the Arab 
(and thus Muslim) population is likely to be larger than estimated.78  The tightly knit 
social framework of the Arab community provides terrorists with the freedom to operate 
with little chance of detection or leaks.  The size and influence of this community may 
explain why the Lebanese government closed its embassy in Asuncion in 1999 and 
opened a consulate in Ciudad del Este.79  The established retail economy of Ciudad del 
Este ranked third in the world in 1994 with $12 billion dollars in cash transactions in 
1994.80  By 2001, the estimated number of Arab retailers in Ciudad del Este was 
7,500.81      
According to Este Foz do Iguacu Islamic Cultural Center spokesman- Mohamed 
Ismail, ninety-nine percent of the Arab nationals living in the TBA profess the Islamic 
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religion.82  A joint U.S.-Argentine intelligence operation conducted between 1999 and 
2001 observed each of the three Muslim Mosques in Ciudad del Este hosting meetings 
between terrorist organization extremists.83  During this investigation, the Argentine 
State Intelligence Service (SIDE) filmed meetings between leaders of the Lebanese 
community and known terrorist operatives and recorded telephone communications made 
by them to terrorist organizations in the Middle East.84  The leader of Ciudad del Este’s 
Prophet Mohamed Mosque, Sheik Munir Fahdel, refuted the allegations that mosques are 
used as Hizballah meeting places and claimed that Hizballah is a “legitimate religious 
and political organization”.85  However, Argentine intelligence services identified Sheik 
Fahdel as a senior Hizballah leader.86   
The future potential for an increase in the radical ideological support base for 
Hizballah is significant considering the large size of the Lebanese-Islamic population in 
the TBA and the fact that the mosques in Ciudad del Este have been linked to terrorist 
organizations by legitimate intelligence operations.  According to Paraguayan 
intelligence reports, the Prophet Mohamed mosque was visited and blessed by Sheiykh 
Fadhallah (Hizballah’s spiritual leader) in 1994.87  While the exact date of the opening 
of the Prophet Mohamed mosque is unclear, Fadhallah’s appearance in 1994 roughly 
coincides with the beginning of Hizballah’s organizational evolution (1992).  The 
demographic characteristics of Paraguay’s Lebanese diaspora likely explain the creation 
of mosques in Paraguay.  However, extensive evidence of international religious links 
and the timing of Fadhallah’s visit to the Prophet Mohamed mosque in Paraguay indicate 
the involvement of external forces (Hizballah) in the promotion of radical Islamic 
ideology (through mosques).  This indicates that the context and direction of the activities 
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of these mosques where directed by external actors.  SIDE investigations of the bombings 
of Israeli targets in Argentina reveal information linking Muhsin Rabbini, a long time 
member of the Iranian Embassy in Argentina, as being a spiritual leader of Latin 
America’s Shiite Muslim community since 1982.88  While this information indicates the 
presence of an Islamic community in Latin America’s southern cone that could 
potentially provide domestic motivations for the development of mosques, Rabbini’s 
links to Iran and Hizballah-sponsored terrorist acts strongly suggests Hizballah’s 
involvement in the establishment of mosques in Latin America.   
The number of Lebanese directly involved in radical ideological terrorist 
operations appears small relative to those who feel a familial camaraderie with the plight 
of those in Lebanon.  However, the radical minority (composed primarily of successful 
businessmen and influential religious and political officials) is likely to benefit from a 
substantial level of support from the remainder of the Lebanese community- whether that 
support is intentionally directed toward radical Islamic fundamentalist ideological goals 
or simply given to fellow members of the diaspora.  In contrast, the level of ideological 
support for terrorist groups like Hizballah is not likely to be significant in Latin American 
countries where a majority of the Lebanese immigrants are Christian, unless the religious 
demographics of these diasporas change dramatically.89    
C. GEO-STRATEGIC VARIABLES       
The TBA’s porous borders and Ciudad del Este’s close proximity to the large 
population centers of the Argentine city of Puerto Iguazu and the Brazilian city of Foz do 
Iguacu create an ideal geographical location to exploit social and economic conditions 
conducive to terrorist activities.  In the early 1970s, the Paraguayan government sought to 
profit from the tourist attraction of Iguazu Falls by establishing a free-trade zone in the 
city of Ciudad del Este, allowing Argentines and Brazilians to purchase cheap 
products.90  However, the open borders and laissez-faire immigration standards intended 
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to increase the efficiency of legitimate business transactions have been exploited by 
terrorist and organized crime groups for illegal operations.    
The most significant geographic characteristic contributing to a hospitable 
environment for terrorist fundraising operations is the proximity of Ciudad del Este to the 
Brazilian city of Foz do Iguacu, and the Argentine city of Puerto Iguaçu.  The TBA’s 
porous borders and Ciudad del Este’s strategic location on the Pan American Highway 
(which provides the critical transportation infrastructure linking the TBA to the Brazilian 
port of Paranagua), combined with the general lack of government authority over the 
territory and the large Arab population creates an ideal environment for Hizballah 
fundraising operations.                
The economic success of the government-sponsored free-trade zone in the TBA 
depends primarily on the efficient transfer of goods and services between Ciudad del Este 
and Foz do Iguacu.  Most of these transfers occur via the Friendship Bridge across the 
Parana River, to which a Brazilian Federal Police Official said, “Everyday we have more 
than 20,000 people crossing that bridge, and you can’t stop and inspect them all.”91  The 
estimated annual turnover in the economy of Ciudad del Este is larger than the economy 
of the rest of Paraguay.92  This annual turnover rate includes the formal and informal 
economies of Ciudad del Este.93  These estimates are rough because they include illegal 
financial transactions made within Ciudad del Este’s informal economy which is beyond 
the regulatory control of the Paraguayan government.  The economic success of the city 
of Ciudad del Este and, particularly, of its Lebanese businessmen, create a situation in 
which the Paraguayan government is reluctant to alienate the “pillars” of their country’s 
economy- Lebanese businessmen in Ciudad del Este.94  The economic success of Ciudad 
del Este’s prominent Lebanese businessmen combined with the poor performance of the 
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remainder of Paraguay’s economy and the weakness of its political institutions leads to 
the widespread corruption of government officials (police, politicians, and   
D. HOST-NATION CHARACTERISTICS 
The Paraguayan government’s inability to effectively reduce the level of 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations within Paraguay, results primarily from a combination 
of geographic, economic, and political factors.  The consequence of these characteristics 
is the creation of a favorable environment for terrorist fundraising operations within 
Paraguay.  Common themes influencing each factor are the weakness of government 
institutions and the pervasiveness of corruption throughout government institutions 
resulting in their inability or unwillingness to efficiently confront a variety of significant 
problems.   
Between 1993 and 2003, Transparency International has consistently ranked the 
Paraguayan government as one of the most corrupt governments in Latin America.95  
The corruption of government officials by suspected terrorists has significantly hindered 
the ability of international anti-terror organizations to disrupt Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations in the TBA and prosecute terrorists.  Terror suspect, Ali Mehri, who made 
significant campaign contributions to powerful officials in the Colorado Party, was 
somehow able to escape from a Paraguayan prison in 2000 and flee to Syria.96  An 
investigation conducted by Paraguay’s National Directorate of Civil Aeronautics found 
that an average of 570 foreigners enter the Ciudad del Este Airport each year with illegal 
documentation after paying bribes averaging $5,000.97  The Directorate of Legal Affairs 
in Paraguay’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs opened several cases in 2001 concerning illicit 
visas, the most damaging of which was one in which the Paraguayan Consulate in 
Panama (which was not even authorized to issue visas) issued terror-suspect Ahmad 
                                                 
95 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Indexes.  Available online at: 
http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html, Accessed on 9/28/04. 
96 Roslyn Mazer, “From T-Shirts to Terrorism: That Fake Nike Swoosh May Be Helping to Fund Bin 
Laden’s Network,” Washington Post, September 30, 2001.  
97 Mariano Cesar Bartolome. Threats to the Security of States: The TBA as a ‘Grey Area’ in the Cone 
of South America. 
 39
Barakat a visa in 1989.98  Another significant case of corruption is of the Paraguayan 
consul in Miami, Carlos Weiss, who sold more than 300 passports, visas, and shipping 
documents to individuals traveling to the TBA between 1999 and 2001.  Weiss sold 
documents to three individuals on the FBI’s terrorist watch list.99   
The effectiveness of Paraguay’s police force in combating terrorism is clearly 
vulnerable to bribery as the average police officer makes only $400 a month.100  With 
the increased amount of attention Arabs have received from Paraguayan police after 
September 11, 2001, accusations of police-led extortion rings have been routinely 
made.101  Maria del Pilar Callizo, head of the Paraguay Chapter of Transparency 
International, said the areas most corrupted were the judicial branch, the political parties, 
and the police.102    
Perhaps the most influential factors limiting the Paraguayan government’s ability 
to effectively combat terrorism are that Paraguay has no anti-terror law and the 
government does not perceive the terrorist threat from Islamic organizations to be 
particularly significant.103  The lack of an anti-terror law severely limits the ability of 
international anti-terror organizations to disrupt the financial support for Hizballah from 
Paraguay.  According to the 2003 U.S. Department of State’s International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, Paraguay has no law making financing terrorist organizations 
illegal.104  Weak government institutions regulating the country’s financial system, 
inconsistent money laundering laws, and ineffective judicial practices related to financial 
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fraud further inhibit anti-terror operations.105  As a result, the Paraguayan government’s 
ability to limit money-laundering operations in support of terrorist organizations is 
significantly limited.106   
The fundamental difference between the terrorist threat perception of the U.S. and 
Paraguayan governments is a significant factor preventing the establishment of effective 
anti-terrorism policy in Paraguay.107  The Paraguayan government’s inaccurate 
perception of the terrorist threat is evident in statements made by the Foreign Minister, 
Moreno Ruffinelli, and the Defense Minister, Migual Candia, denying the presence of 
Islamic terrorist groups in the TBA.108  In addition to the reluctance of many 
government officials to recognize the presence of active terror organizations within the 
region, most of those who do acknowledge their presence do not perceive any legitimate 
threat to Paraguay- to date, Hizballah has not attacked any targets in Paraguay and is not 
likely to in the future.  Table 5 lists the characteristics of Paraguay that contribute to its 
permissiveness for terrorist fundraising operations.  
                                                 
105 Ibid, and FATF Annual Report 2003-2004, “Paraguay.”  Available online at: 
http://www1.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR2004-Annexes_en.pdf, Accessed on 12/4/04. 
106 “US Says Al Qeada and Hezbollah in Ecuador,” Guayaquil el Universo, 19 April 2002, FBIS 
Document ID: LAP20020419000026, and “Foreign Minister: Ecuador Not Among Countries harboring 
Terrorists,” Guayaquil el Universo, 4 October 2001, FBIS Document ID: LAP20011004000030. 
107 For a more comprehensive explanation of the differing perceptions among Latin American 
political leaders regarding terrorism’s threat to national security issues, see Pedro Villagra Delgado, 
Hemispheric Security: A Perception from the South, Carlisle, Pennsylvania: Strategic Studies Institute, July 
2003.  Available online at: http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pdffiles/00006.pdf, Accessed on 12/5/04.  
108 “Paraguay: Defense Minister, Ciudad del Este Authorities Deny Terrorist Presence,” [Asuncion] 
October 28, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20021028000075; and “Paraguay: Vice Interior Minister 
Confirms Presence of ‘Dormant’ Islamic Terrorist Cells,” [Asuncion] May 4, 2001, FBIS Document ID: 
LAP20010505000002.  
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Table 5.  Characteristics Contributing to Paraguay’s Permissiveness  
 
    
Permissive Threat Environments (include both geo-strategic variables and Diaspora 
characteristics). 
 Weak political institutions 
 Widespread government corruption 
 Weak legal framework (relating to anti-terror and anti-money laundering laws) 
 Prominent Lebanese Diasporas (Lebanese businessmen) 
 Geo-strategic location (high profit-potential economic environments) 
 Communal support of Diaspora (High) 
 Ideological support of Diaspora (High) 
    
Based on the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that several variables combine to 
determine the nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay: 
the weakness of Paraguayan political institutions; the favorable geo-strategic 
characteristics of Ciudad del Este; the strength of the Lebanese diaspora’s 
business/economic network; and the homogeneity of the Lebanese diaspora’s religious 
composition.  There are several significant problems with the political landscape of 
Paraguay that have combined to enhance the attractiveness of Ciudad del Este to terrorist 
organizations.  A brief summary of the most significant problems of the Paraguayan 
political landscape are widespread corruption of government officials, inefficient 
immigration laws and border control, terrorism not consistently being recognized by 
government officials as a legitimate problem, and ineffective laws dealing with terrorism.  
There are significant geo-strategic characteristics of the TBA in general, and Ciudad del 
Este in particular, that make the region a “haven” for terrorist fundraising operations by 
simultaneously capitalizing on the weaknesses of the political institutions and the 
strengths of the surrounding cultural resources.  The economic significance of the city of 
Ciudad del Este to the Paraguayan-national economy combined with the prominence of 
the Lebanese community within Ciudad del Este’s economy likely discourages the 
Paraguayan government from aggressively combating economic characteristics that 
facilitate Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  The uniform religious composition of the 
Lebanese diaspora provides Hizballah operatives with essential levels of cover and 
legitimacy.    
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Several observations can be made about the relative strength of the characteristics 
contributing to the creation of a terrorist threat environment in Paraguay.  These 
observations are based on the evidence presented in this case study and the potential 
indicators of the relative strength of the primary characteristics of permissive threat 
environments (communal and/or ideological support, and influential Lebanese 
businessmen with links to Hizballah) outlined in Chapter II.  On one hand, the extensive 
evidence available documenting the large amount of donations made by members of 
Paraguay’s Lebanese diaspora to Hizballah-linked organizations in Lebanon indicates a 
high degree of communal support.  On the other hand, Hizballah’s widespread use of 
extortion on the Lebanese business community is likely indicative of low communal 
support within the diaspora.  Although the evidence of Hizballah’s fundraising operations 
in Paraguay seems to present conflicting implications regarding the likely level of 
communal support Hizballah receives within the diaspora, the evidence supporting a 
strong ideological support base within the diaspora (specifically, the magnitude of 
donations) outweighs any evidence that the communal support base is weak.  Evidence 
linking mosques in Ciudad del Este with Hizballah operatives and the large percentage of 
Lebanese diaspora members who profess the Islamic religion indicate strong ideological 
support for Hizballah. 
While evidence supports the claim that the levels of communal and ideological 
support for Hizballah appear high within Paraguay’s Lebanese diaspora, the influence of 
prominent Lebanese businessmen with links to Hizballah appears to be the most 
significant contributing factor facilitating fundraising operations in Paraguay.  The 
significance of the relationship between Lebanese businessmen and Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations in Paraguay is heightened by the economic importance of the 
economy of Ciudad del Este to the success of Paraguay’s overall economy.      
Table 6 provides a useful guide to analyze how the geo-strategic variables, host-
nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics of Paraguay shape the fundraising 
operations likely to be employed there.  Table 6 combines the list of fundraising 
techniques used by Hizballah in Paraguay (Table 4) with the characteristics that 
contribute to Paraguay’s permissiveness (Table 5).  Characteristics of permissive threat 
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environments are listed along the horizontal axis and the menu of options available for 
fundraising operations are listed along the vertical axis.  Environmental characteristics 
favorable to a particular fundraising operation will be indicated with an X at the point of 
intersection.  
Table 6.  Environmental Characteristics and Fundraising Techniques in Paraguay 






















































       
Piracy 
X X X  X   
Extortion 
X X X    X 
Donations 
   X  X X 
Money 
Laundering X  X  X   
The large amount of support Hizballah receives from Paraguay’s Lebanese 
diaspora, indicated by high levels of communal and ideological support, is not typical of 
the support levels evident in other Lebanese diasporas in Latin America- namely the 
Lebanese community in Ecuador.  The nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations in Paraguay relative to the levels of communal and ideological support are 
significant when considering the small population size of Paraguay’s Lebanese diaspora 
relative to Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora and the corresponding differences in their 
religious composition.  Diaspora characteristics (and their influence on fundraising 
operations) become increasingly important when similarities in geo-strategic variables 
and host nation characteristics evident across cases shape Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations in similar ways (as Chapter IV demonstrates is the case with Paraguay and 
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IV. HIZBALLAH’S FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS IN ECUADOR  
The organization of this chapter is intended to progress from a general description 
of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Ecuador to a detailed explanation of how the 
nature and significance of these fundraising operations are shaped by geo-strategic 
variables, host-nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics.  The chapter is divided 
into four sections: a description of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Ecuador, a 
description of the Lebanese diaspora and how its characteristics shape Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations, a description of significant geo-strategic variables and how they 
shape Hizballah’s fundraising operations, and a description of host-nation characteristics 
that are conducive to Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  The information presented in 
this chapter will validate the framework of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in 
Paraguay by determining to what extent the model can be used for fundraising operations 
elsewhere in Latin America.  Like Paraguay, Ecuador has geo-strategic variables and 
host-nation characteristics that facilitate Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  However, 
Hizballah appears to have adapted its fundraising operations in Ecuador to mitigate the 
influence of seemingly unfavorable diaspora characteristics.  
The analysis of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Ecuador is valuable because 
Ecuador and Paraguay have similar geo-strategic variables and host-nation characteristics 
which result in consistent forces shaping Hizballah’s fundraising operations across both 
cases.  Of particular interest then, are the differences in diaspora characteristics evident 
between Paraguay and Ecuador and their influence on the nature and significance of 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations.   
A. HIZBALLAH’S FUNDRAISING OPERATIONS        
Currently, the Lebanese community in Ecuador is distributed predominantly 
among the coastal cities of Guayaquil and Esmaraldas, and the capital, Quito.  While the 
social demographics of the community represent various levels of the socioeconomic 
spectrum, a significant percentage of the import/export businesses located in and around 
the ports of Guayaquil and Esmaraldas are owned and operated by Lebanese 
businessmen.  Investigations of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay 
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demonstrate clear trends by which official Hizballah representatives coordinate their 
activities primarily with prominent Lebanese businessmen who are sympathetic to radical 
Islamic ideology. These Lebanese businessmen then coordinate various legal and illegal 
fundraising operations within their respective communities.  The primary legal means 
Hizballah employs to generate financial support from Paraguay are donations made by 
the Lebanese community to either Hizballah itself or to various social organizations that 
support its terrorist activities.109  The primary illegal means Hizballah employs to 
generate financial support from Paraguay are extortion, sales of contraband and pirated 
goods, and money laundering.110  Ecuador’s Lebanese community is larger, and has 
access to a more robust economic and political infrastructure, than the Lebanese 
community in Paraguay.  As a result, the Lebanese community in Ecuador provides a 
potentially more favorable environment for Hizballah’s fundraising operations than the 
Lebanese community in Paraguay.  However, this potential is limited by the religious 
composition (predominantly Catholic) of Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora.  In Ecuador, 
evidence indicates Hizballah uses money laundering and smuggling operations and 
suggests its use of drug trafficking for fundraising operations.  While extortion is a well-
documented tactic of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) along 
Ecuador’s border with Colombia,111 the extent of Hizballah’s use of extortion on the 
Lebanese business community remains unclear.  However, Hizballah’s use of extortion 
on the Lebanese business community in Ciudad del Este, Paraguay provides an example 
of its potential profitability in Ecuador.112       
The Colombian conflict produced well-established regional transit routes for gun 
running and drug trafficking involving countries on all of Colombia’s borders.113  
                                                 
109 “Extremistas receberam US$50 mi de Foz do Iguacu” Folha de S. Paulo, December 3, 2001; and 
ABC Color [Internet version-www] as translated by FBIS, “Paraguay: Daily reports More Evidence of 
Barakat’s Contributions to Hizballah,” May 28, 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020528000073. 
110 Rex Hudson, “Terrorist and organized Crime Groups in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) of South 
America.”  Library of Congress Report, July 2003. p. 9. 
111 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, August 2004. Available online 
at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35761.htm, Accessed on 9/5/04. 
112 Jeffrey Goldberg, “In the Party of God,” The New Yorker, October 28, 2002. 
113 “Colombia and its Neighbors: The Tentacles of Instability”, International Crisis Group Latin 
America Report No. 3, April 2003. p. 3.    
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Ecuador and Colombia share common economic and domestic political fragilities that, 
when combined with the influence of Colombia’s contagious instability, produce an “arc 
of instability” in the Andean region.114  While regional paramilitary groups like the 
FARC have traditionally been involved in the majority of stages of production, 
distribution, and money laundering related to drug trafficking and gun running,115 recent 
trends (since the early 1990s) indicate an increased involvement of Islamic terrorist 
organizations in general, and Hizballah in particular.116  
Hizballah’s original fatwa, issued in the mid-1980s, related to drug distribution, 
establishes a pragmatic motivation for its involvement in drug trafficking and supports 
evidence indicating its increased involvement in drug trafficking: “We are making these 
drugs for Satan-America and the Jews.  If we cannot kill them with guns, so we will kill 
them with drugs.”117  This statement alone does not provide sufficient evidence to 
demonstrate that Hizballah is involved in drug trafficking in Latin America.  However it 
does provide an organizational motivation to support available information (see note 8) of 
Hizballah’s involvement in drug trafficking in Latin America.  The U.S. Department of 
State’s 2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) lists Ecuador as 
one of twenty-four major illicit drug-transit countries.118  The two most significant 
transit routes between Colombia and Ecuador are: from Esmeraldas to Tumaco (both in 
Ecuador), to Guachucal and Pasto (both in Colombia); and along the Pan-American 
Highway: from Quito-Ibarra-Tulcan (all in Ecuador), to Ipiales (in Colombia).119  
                                                 
114 “Latin America Seen as Potential Source of Terrorist Threat to US,” Moscow Nezavisimoye 
Voyennoye Obozreniye, 14 Mar 03.  FBIS Document ID: CEP20030314000319.  
115 Ibid, p. 4, and “Colombia: El Espectador Gives ‘Organizational Chart’ of Drug Cartel in Narino,” 
Bogota El Espectador [Internet version-www], 11 Jun 01.  FBIS Document ID: LAP2001061000034. 
116 Rex Hudson, “A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and other Extremist Groups.”  
Library of Congress Report, May 2002. p. 8, Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., “International Terrorism in 
Latin America,” Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, 
September 28, 1995, and “Article Analyzes Why War on Terrorism Will Affect Colombia,” Bogota 
Cambio, 24 Sept 01.  FBIS Document ID: LAP20010924000008.  
117 Ibid, p. 10. 
118 U.S. Department of State report: The International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2002, 
p. 4, and  Patterns of Global Terrorism, 21 May 2002. Available online at:  
 http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/, Accessed on 9/3/04.   
119 “Despite Official Denial, Article Says Ecuador to Colombia Gunrunning Exists,” Bogota Semana 
[Internet version-www], 10 Nov 03. FBIS Document ID: LAP20031109000021. 
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Ecuador’s northern border is particularly vulnerable to drug and weapons trafficking due 
to its proximity to the Colombian departments of Putumayo and Narino, which account 
for nearly thirty-seven percent of Colombia’s total coca production.120  While a 
substantial percentage of the goods transported via these routes consist of chemical 
precursors used in various stages of the drug production process,121 trends indicating 
their increased use by Islamic terrorist organizations have significant national security 
implications.122  As Tom Riley, the spokesman for the Office of National Drug Control 
Policy explained, “If you wanted to smuggle bombs into America, there is a ready-made 
network to do that.  It is the drug network.”123  The real strategic significance of 
Ecuador is provided by the country’s Pacific ports of Guayaquil and Esmaraldas, which 
provide the infrastructure necessary for the international distribution of refined cocaine 
and heroin smuggled from Colombia.124  An example of the scope of the international 
drug shipment routes through Ecuadorian ports is provided by an incident when British 
Customs Officials confiscated 651 kilograms of cocaine hidden in a cargo container on a 
ship originating from Ecuador in November 2003.125  The established transit routes and 
their geographical proximity to Colombia and strategic ports in Ecuador are highlighted 






                                                 
120 “Colombia and its Neighbors: The Tentacles of Instability”, International Crisis Group Latin 
America Report No. 3, April 2003. p. 8, and “Ecuadorian Army Commander Admits Weapons Crossing 
into Colombia,” Bogota El Espectador [Internet version-www], 13 Sep 03.  FBIS Document ID: 
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123 Mary Jacoby,  “War’s New Target: Drugs,” St. Petersburg Times, February 11, 2002. 
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While the complete scope of Hizballah’s cooperation with the FARC remains 
unclear, the FARC has regularly operated in Ecuador for decades.  In a January 2004 
interview with Quito-based newspaper El Comercio, General (Ret.) Rene Vargas Pazzos 
(former head of Ecuador’s Armed Forces) detailed how the FARC has been using 
Ecuador and its transportation infrastructure for strategic smuggling operations for forty 
years.126  However, there is a high probability that Hizballah, recognizing the potential 
for utilizing its connections with the Lebanese-controlled business infrastructure in 
strategic locations throughout Ecuador to launder their profits, is involved in regional 
drug trafficking, when considering the geographic proximity of FARC operations in the 
                                                 
126 “Ecuador: FARC Leader Reyes Escapes Police Surveillance in Quito,” El Comercio [Internet 
version-www], 11 Jan 04.  FBIS Document ID: LAP20040112000029. 
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Colombian departments of Putumayo and Narino and the suspected links between the 
FARC and Hizballah.127  
In 2001, the Colombian Technical Investigation Corps (CTI) arrested a Lebanese 
businessman, named Mohammed Ali Farhad, with ties to Hizballah for managing a $650 
million cigarette smuggling and money laundering operation between Ipiales, Colombia 
and ports in Ecuador.128  The investigation of Mohammed Ali Farhad established a link 
between Farhad and a Hizballah-backed money laundering operation, run by Eric and 
Alexander Mansur, through the Mansur Free Zone Trading Company N.V.129  The 
Mansur Free Zone Trading Company N.V. was Phillip Morris’ main distributor in Latin 
America until the U.S. indicted the Mansur brothers for money laundering.130   
According to a lawsuit filed against Philip Morris in 2002 by the Republic of 
Ecuador,131 the company sold tobacco products to smugglers in exchange for gun 
running and drug trafficking money, commonly referred to as the Black Market Peso 
Exchange (BMPE) from 1987 to 2002.132  According to the lawsuit, Phillip Morris Inc.:  
                                                 
127 Samii A. William, “Iranians Out of Colombia,” Iran Report [RFE/RL News], 27 December 1999.  
Available online at: http://www.rferl.org/iran-report/1999/12/-511299.asp, Accessed on 8/31/04, and 
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when we talk about connections, it's important to remember they're all born of the same womb in that 
sense.” 
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Library of Congress Report, May 2002. pp. 47-50, and Vheadline.com (Venezuela), 1 Apr 00. Accessed on 
8/31/04. 
129 Fabio Castillo, “The Hizballah Contacts in Colombia,” Part III of “Tracking the Tentacles of the 
Middle East in South America,” El Spectador [Internet version-www], 9 Dec 01.  FBIS Document ID: 
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Library of Congress Report, May 2002. pp. 49-50 for a detailed description of how the BMPE functioned.  
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…violated Ecuador's regulatory scheme by illegally selling tobacco 
products on the Ecuadorian black market. To further these unlawful 
enterprises, Ecuador alleges Defendants committed numerous acts, 
including mail and wire fraud. Moreover, Defendants allegedly falsified 
shipping records, stamps, and labels on packages that Ecuadorian officials 
inspected…  Ecuador claims that the RJR Defendants, through their use of 
distributors, ship handlers, and smugglers, established the routes and 
mechanisms by which cigarettes were smuggled.133  
 
There is evidence that the group originally responsible for bombing the World 
Trade Center in 1993, and which later merged with Hizballah and al-Qaeda, had 
counterfeit cigarette tax stamps in its possession, presumably from Ecuador.134  A 
significant percentage of the profits Mohammed Ali Farhad generated from the BMPE in 
Ecuador were funneled to Hizballah.135  Although case specifics regarding the 
identification of individual import/export companies in Ecuador used by Mohammed Ali 
Farhad to ship contraband and money to and from Ecuador are not available, the nature of 
the operations detailed in the case are consistent with joint FARC-Hizballah smuggling 
operations- to the extent that the same transit routes used by the FARC to ship drugs and 
arms were used to smuggle cigarettes.   
Similar to the Lebanese diaspora in Ciudad del Este, many Lebanese immigrants 
in Ecuador maintain close ties with family in Lebanon and identify with the political 
struggles of the Lebanese people.  This level of communal identification in the Lebanese 
diaspora of Ciudad del Este is demonstrated by the large amount of donations made to 
political organizations in Lebanon tied to Hizballah.136  More research is required by 
intelligence organizations to accurately determine the amount of donations made by 
Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora to pro-Hizballah organizations in Lebanon.  The significant 
number of Ecuador-based individuals and organizations placed on the Office of Foreign 
                                                 
133 Republic of Ecuador v. Phillip Morris Companies, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
134 Brian Louis, Cigarette Smuggling a Worry: Illegal Sales Help Terrorist Groups Worldwide, ATF 
Fears, Winston-Salem Journal, 3 November 2002. 
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Assets Control’s 2004 Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons list indicates 
the existence of a substantial network of institutions and individuals with financial links 
to terrorist organizations within Ecuador.137  To be sure, a large percentage of the 
individuals and organizations are on this list because of their links with drug trafficking 
organizations.  However, the suggested links between Hizballah and the FARC would 
likely make the financial network represented by the members on the list valuable to 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations as well.   
A financial network of this sort appears ideal for funneling money to Hizballah-
linked organizations.  However, the amount of donations made by the Ecuadorian 
Lebanese diaspora is likely to be low when considering evidence of low levels of 
communal and ideological support for Hizballah. This trend is consistent with evidence 
linking large amounts of donations from the Lebanese community in Ciudad del Este to 
their high levels of communal and ideological support for Hizballah.  However, evidence 
of an emerging presence of Islamic mosques in Ecuador that espouse radical religious 
ideology consistent with Hizballah’s ideology has the potential to increase future levels 
of ideological and communal support.  This increase combined with the terror-linked 
financial network in Ecuador would then likely result in a substantial volume of 
donations- consistent with that evident in Paraguay.   
Promoting the expansion of the Islamic presence in Ecuador appears to be a vital 
component in Hizballah’s strategy to increase the overall profit potential for its 
fundraising operations in Ecuador.  While the sources of funding for the growing number 
of mosques in Ecuador are uncertain,138 it is unlikely that Ecuador’s small Islamic 
population is capable of providing all of the funds required to finance the activities of the 
mosques.  The established financial and ideological links between Iran and Hizballah are 
a likely source of funding for Ecuadorian mosques (espousing Islamic fundamentalist 
rhetoric consistent with Hizballah’s radical ideology) considering the close relationship 
between Hizballah’s command leadership and Iranian religious institutions and clergy, 
                                                 
137 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control: Specially Designated 
Nationals and Blocked Persons, 14 September 2004. Available online at: 
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sdn/t11sdn.pdf, Accessed on 9/20/04.  
138 The Islamic Center of Ecuador’s homepage specifically claims to receive no international funding.    
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and recent operations by the Iranian Embassy in southern Colombia.139  Radical 
members of Iranian clergy have traditionally held positions in Iran’s Ministries of Islamic 
Guidance and Foreign Affairs to maintain relationships with Hizballah leadership 
(Secretary Hassan Nasserallah) and place its members in Iranian embassies abroad to 
facilitate Hizballah’s fundraising operations.140   The estimated annual Iranian financial 
support for Hizballah is between fifty and one-hundred million dollars.141   
In 2000, the Iranian Embassy in Bogota, Colombia, announced the cancellation of 
the construction of an Iran-financed multi-million dollar meat packing industry in the 
FARC-controlled department of Putumayo, after inquiries by Colombian government 
officials and businessmen.  The head of the Colombian National Cattlemen's Association 
questioned the development of the slaughterhouse in a location that cannot support the 
export requirements of a facility of that size.  Although the Iranian Ambassador to 
Colombia, Hussein Sheikh Zeineddin, claimed the area was chosen because Tehran 
wanted to contribute to the Colombian peace process and facilitate negotiations between 
the FARC and the Colombian authorities, it appears more likely that Iran was interested 
in establishing a factory in the center of a FARC controlled cocaine production area to 
facilitate Hizballah’s involvement in regional fundraising operations.142   
The potential for a future increase in the radical ideological support base for 
Hizballah in Ecuador is significant considering the large size of the Lebanese population, 
relative to the Lebanese population in Paraguay or the TBA, and the fact that mosques in 
Ecuador promote rhetoric consistent with radical Hizballah ideology.  The number of 
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Lebanese directly involved in radical ideological terrorist operations is likely to be small 
relative to those who feel a familial camaraderie with the plight of those in Lebanon.  
However, the radical minority (composed primarily of prominent businessmen and 
influential religious leaders) is likely to benefit from an increased level of support from 
the remainder of the Lebanese diaspora- regardless of whether that support is 
intentionally directed toward shared ideological goals or simply given to fellow members 
of the diaspora.  Table 7lists the fundraising operations used by Hizballah in Ecuador. 
Table 7.  Hizballah’s Fundraising Techniques in Ecuador 
 
Techniques used by Hizballah for fundraising in Ecuador. 
 Money laundering 
 Smuggling 
 Drug trafficking 
 
B.  ECUADOR’S LEBANESE DIASPORA          
The Lebanese diaspora in Ecuador is one of the oldest and well-established 
immigrant communities in the country.  The story of the evolution of Lebanese 
immigrants in Ecuador from “Arab invaders” to influential businessmen and politicians is 
intertwined with the history of Ecuador’s development.143  The process of increased 
interaction between the Lebanese and native Ecuadorians throughout the country’s 
development eventually resulted in the social, economic, and political integration of the 
Lebanese, though not their complete assimilation.   The Lebanese immigrants 
experienced a relatively low level of prejudice and opposition because of the initial small 
size of their immigrant population (only five “Turkos”144 registered in the 1890 
census)145 and the fact that the size of their community increased slowly.  A significant 
characteristic of Lebanese immigrants that eased their transition into Ecuadorian society 
was their religion.  The majority of the Lebanese immigrants into Ecuador were 
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Christian.  Many Christian Lebanese began to leave Lebanon for the new world as a 
result of increasing violence with Muslim Lebanese.146  Arab Muslim disillusionment 
following the defeat of the Turks in the 1911 and 1912 wars with Italy and the Balkan 
states resulted in increased Muslim nationalism in Lebanon and increased levels of 
conflict with Christian Lebanese.147 
At the turn of the century, the Ecuadorian society had a cultural disdain for trade 
and merchants left over from the Spanish colonial period.  This created the 
socioeconomic niche necessary for the Lebanese diaspora to prosper.  The cultural 
characteristics of the Lebanese immigrants favored a strong work ethic and a family-
oriented business style.  The combination of these conflicting social characteristics 
resulted in the success of the Lebanese diaspora in the businesses of importing and 
merchandise sales.  As a result, a majority of Lebanese immigrants established businesses 
in the port city of Guayaquil.  Lebanese immigrants entered Ecuador with enough capital 
to open small businesses immediately, or they steadily accumulated enough capital to 
eventually open businesses by traveling and selling small items.  Through hard work and 
determination, the Lebanese diaspora eventually increased the size and profits of their 
businesses.  However, despite their relatively rapid economic success, the Lebanese 
remained socially and politically isolated.148   
The Lebanese formed the Sociedad Union Libanesa in 1921,149 which was 
intended to represent the future social, political, and economic interests of the Lebanese 
community.  The Ecuadorian government formally recognized the Sociedad Union 
Libanesa on August 8, 1921.150  The creation and formal recognition of a representative 
union marked a significant step in the integration of the Lebanese diaspora into the 
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economic and sociopolitical institutions of Ecuador.151  The Sociedad Union Libanesa 
served as the institutional precursor to increased Lebanese participation in leadership 
positions in other social and political organizations such as political parties.  In an effort 
to maintain Lebanese heritage within the diaspora, female members of the Sociedad 
Union Libanesa established Arabic language and Lebanese history schools for their 
children.  Teaching Lebanese children the accurate history of Lebanon and maintaining 
their proficiency of the Arabic language reinforced their cultural heritage. 
The Lebanese began to diversify their business interests throughout the 1920s by 
establishing textile factories in Ecuador.  Their international connections produced steady 
supplies of cheap cotton that allowed their textile factories to prosper.  Because these 
textile factories were established in Quito, the Lebanese began to expand their influence 
beyond Guayaquil.  Since the Lebanese population was smaller in Quito than in 
Guayaquil, their presence was less threatening to Ecuadorians, and they tended to be 
more socially and politically introverted.  Lebanese merchants in Quito utilized their 
import connections in Guayaquil to undersell the local competition.  Despite economic 
instability, their steady access to an inexpensive supply of cotton resulted in increased 
profits.152  These profits were reinvested into Ecuadorian industry by creating a 
Lebanese-owned textile factory in 1928 called “La Perla del Pacifico.”153  Despite the 
economic instability resulting from the Great Depression, the willingness of the Lebanese 
to invest in Quito’s economy demonstrates that the stake the immigrant community had 
in Ecuador was large, and increasing.  As the success of Lebanese merchants in Quito 
increased, so did their influence in social and political circles.154 
By the start of the 1930s, the Lebanese diaspora established a solid economic 
foundation (in Quito and Guayaquil) that enabled the immigrants to exert an increasing 
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amount of influence in Ecuador’s social and political institutions.  Several Guayaquil-
based Lebanese businessmen made the important sociopolitical step of becoming 
members of the Chambers of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce.155  This level of 
involvement placed Lebanese immigrants in regional corporate business decision-making 
positions that, in turn, influenced regional and national political decisions.  By the end of 
the 1930s, in addition to their established industries of import and sales, the relatively 
small Lebanese community was firmly established in agriculture.156    
By the mid-1960s, many third-generation Lebanese were returning to Ecuador 
after being educated in foreign universities (as was the custom in Latin America).  These 
well-educated children of Lebanese immigrants returned to Ecuadorian society with 
opportunities their parents did not have.  Since their arrival just prior to the turn of the 
century, the Lebanese immigrant community worked hard to establish a legitimate 
position of influence in Ecuador’s economic, political, and social institutions.  The most 
successful of the Lebanese diaspora established influence with Ecuador’s traditional elite, 
while the bulk of the community contributed to the lower and emerging middle-class 
work force.  However, despite almost a century of incorporation, the Lebanese in 
Ecuador continued to face prejudice and opposition.  The third-generation Lebanese 
immigrants simultaneously embraced their cultural heritage (by maintaining strong ties 
within the diaspora) and desired cultural acceptance (through increased social interaction 
and assimilation with native Ecuadorians).   
By the mid-1970s, the Lebanese diaspora established significant levels of 
incorporation into Ecuador’s economic and political institutions, and were beginning to 
make significant progress toward incorporation into social institutions outside of their 
immigrant community.  The economic and political incorporation achieved by the 
Lebanese diaspora provided Lebanese immigrants with levels of influence that, in many 
cases, contributed to the path of Ecuador’s development.  However, Lebanese immigrants 
continued to struggle to balance their cultural heritage with definitions of their immigrant 
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status in society.  The importance of their cultural heritage was reinvigorated for many 
third-generation Lebanese immigrants by the escalation of violence between Christians 
and Muslims in Lebanon.  The civil war in Lebanon, and its resultant diasporas, changed 
the demographics of the Lebanese community in Ecuador.  The character of these 
changes was dependent on the development and level of incorporation achieved by the 
Lebanese diaspora from 1900 to 1975.  
The Lebanese community in Ecuador has the necessary infrastructure to control 
its own cultural, commercial, educational, and social activities.  It has also demonstrated 
its ability to influence the political development of Ecuador.  Although a large portion of 
the Lebanese community in Ecuador is Catholic, recent trends indicate an increasing 
presence of Islamic Lebanese in Ecuador, particularly in Quito.  According to current 
rough estimates, the size of Ecuador’s Islamic community is between five and fifteen 
hundred.157 While the size of Lebanese-Islamic community may seem insignificant 
relative to the size of Ecuador’s Lebanese community (roughly 95,000),158 recent 
rhetoric associated with several of the country’s newly formed Islamic organizations is 
consistent with radical Islamic ideology (espoused by terrorist organizations like 
Hizballah).  
The Khaled Ibn al Walid Islamic Center, located in Quito, is evidence that a 
significant shift in the composition of the religious characteristics of Ecuador’s Lebanese 
diaspora is underway.159  The use of a prominent historical heroic Islamic figure- 
Khaled Ibn al Walid, in the name of the Islamic Center is significant for several reasons 
and is likely indicative of a growth in Islamic fundamental sentiment within the 
Ecuadorian Lebanese community, consistent with that of members of the pro-Hizballah 
Lebanese population in Paraguay.  Khaled Ibn al Walid, otherwise known as the “Sword 
of Islam”, was an Islamic Emir, appointed directly by Allah, who led the Muslim Army 
in the eighth century against the Roman Army.  The two main themes Islamic 
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fundamentalist leaders traditionally evoke through rhetorical uses of the symbolic 
significance of Khaled Ibn al Walid are the religious importance of martyrdom and the 
necessity to continue the fierce fight against a seemingly invulnerable enemy of Islam. 
A prominent example of a senior Islamic religious leader using rhetorical 
references to the themes symbolized by Khaled Ibn al Walid occurred in May 2001, when 
Sheikh Ikrimeh Sabri, the Palestinian Authority Mufti of Jerusalem and Palestine, praised 
martyrdom for the defense of Islam against American oppression.               
Oh Muslims. Oh believers, the Prophet's companion, Abdullah Ibn 
Rawwaha, was the army's third commander. He took the flag and fought 
until he was martyred. The Muslim soldiers were perplexed because they 
had no commanders left, since the three commanders who were appointed 
by the Prophet, were already martyred. The soldiers were about to retreat, 
but then, the Prophet's companion, 'Uqbah Ibn Abi 'Aamer, said to them: 
"Oh people, a man is better off being killed with his face to the front than 
while withdrawing'. Yes, Oh Muslims. The soldiers realized their situation 
and agreed on appointing as Emir, the noble and heroic, Khaled Ibn Al-
Walid, who managed, by his wisdom, his ability, and military skills, to 
save the army from total destruction. This was the first battle that was 
commanded by Khaled Ibn Al-Walid since he embraced Islam. When he 
took the flag that day, he fought fiercely.160 
 
Sheikh Ikrimeh Sabri is not a direct representative of Hizballah (nor was he when 
he gave the above sermon).  However, his representation of the Palestinian Authority and 
the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s anti-Israeli/U.S. sentiment is consistent with the radical 
ideology used by Hizballah to legitimize its actions and with the organization’s tactical 
operations supporting the anti-Israeli campaign.161  Another recent example of the link 
between the symbolism of Khaled Ibn al Walid and its influence on the ideology and 
tactics of terrorist organizations is the July 7, 2004 kidnapping of a Filipino truck driver 
in Iraq by the Khaled Ibn al Walid Brigade.162 
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Although it is not possible to accurately quantify the size of the Lebanese 
population sympathetic to the type of Islamic fundamentalism espoused by the Khaled 
Ibn al Walid Islamic Center, the very existence of the mosques in Quito symbolizing 
traditional themes of Islamic fundamentalism represent a potentially significant change in 
the religious composition of the Lebanese Diaspora.  This changing demographic 
indicates a religious trend that potentially increases the Lebanese Diaspora’s 
predisposition to support Hizballah’s ideology and tactics.     
The Islamic Center of Ecuador Masjid Assalaam, also located in Quito, was 
established on October 15, 1994 and was the first Muslim religious organization to be 
officially recognized by the Ecuadorian government.163  The religious, social, cultural, 
and educational activities of the mosque are conducted according to Muslim Sunni 
traditions.  An extensive investigation of Hizballah’s alleged involvement in the 1994 
bombing of the Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association (AMIA) in Buenos Aires164 
eventually resulted in the Secretariat for State Intelligence’s (SIDE) conclusion that 
“there is currently no operational difference between the Sunnites and the Shiites,” and 
that “…the Sunnite organization maintains various contacts with elements suspected of 
being Hizballah sympathizers or affiliates.”165  Although the focus of the SIDE 
investigation is on Hizballah activities in the Triborder Area, there is evidence to suggest 
that similar characteristics exist in the relationships between Sunni and Shiite Lebanese in 
Ecuador.  Although the Sunni tradition is not traditionally associated with the Shiite 
ideology of Hizballah, recent rhetoric in sermons given at the mosque indicate strong 
anti-Israeli/U.S. sentiment consistent with Hizballah’s ideology.  The following quotes 
taken from different sermons given at the Islamic Center of Ecuador highlight the 
similarities between the teachings of the mosque and the radical ideology used to justify 
                                                 
163Yahya Juan Suquillo, Islam in Ecuador, May 2002.  Available online at: 
http://www.geocities.com/WestHollywood/Park/6443/LatinAmerica/ecuador.html, Accessed on 8/25/04.  
The link to the Islamic Center of Ecuador Masjid Assalaam is 
http://www.centroislamico.org.ec/principal.htm, Accessed on 8/25/04.  
164 Ambassador Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., “International Terrorism in Latin America,” Testimony to the 
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on International Relations, September 28, 1995. 
165 “Bin Laden’s Followers in Triborder Area Probed,” FBIS Document ID: WA1907180899, July 19, 
1999, and “Argentine Intelligence Services’ 1999 Report on Usama Bin-Ladin’s Agents in Triborder Area 
Viewed,” FBIS Document ID: LAP20010916000021, September 16, 2001. 
 61
Hizballah’s tactics and operations: “Oh you believers, take neither the Jews nor the 
Christians as Allied Forces, since they are allied between them,”166 and “This legislation 
is the correct footpath, this is the footpath of Grace of the Prophets, of the noble martyrs 
and other correct people.”167  Various verses of the Qur’an stress that Muslims should 
seek assistance from other Muslims and distance themselves from non-believers.168  The 
idea of separation is reinforced by religious rhetoric and is particularly dangerous when 
combined with literal interpretations of verses from the Qur’an advocating the use of 
force against non-Muslims:  
Fight and slay the unbelievers wherever you find them and beleaguer 
them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem [of war]; but if they 
repent and establish regular prayers and pay zaka [Islamic alms and 
religious tax] then open the way for them, for God is most forgiving…169 
 
Contemporary non-violent Muslims believe the historical context of the 
timeframe in which these verses where written (one in which the existence of Islam was 
directly threatened) determines their applicability.  In their view, a literal interpretation of 
these verses is not applicable today because Islam’s existence is not in danger.  However, 
Muslims who view the current international environment as an oppressive encroachment 
of Western ideals threatening the existence of Islam find justification for the radical 
ideology and tactics of a terrorist group (like Hizballah) in the verses of the Qur’an. 
Sheikh Saleh bin Hamid, is listed on the Islamic Center of Ecuador Masjid 
Assalaam’s homepage as one of its primary religious leaders and teachers.  In response to 
the conduct of U.S. military operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in 
Afghanistan, Sheikh Saleh bin Hamid issued the following fatwa:  
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And the wonder increases, and the Lord gets angry when the Muslims 
languish about the support of their wronged Muslim brothers, then how if 
a concern or he thought or one of the Muslims volunteered in the 
participation of the unbelievers with hitting the Muslims.  It is temptations 
that leave forbearing and confused, and disasters for its terror the 
mountains crack…170    
 
The combination of rhetorical teachings presented above establish the Islamic 
Center of Ecuador Masjid Assalaam as an organization within the Lebanese community 
that is sympathetic to Hizballah’s utilization of martyr operations to destroy enemies of 
Islam at best, and supportive at worst.171  When considering the joint U.S.-Argentine 
intelligence operation conducted between 1999 and 2001 that linked mosques, in Ciudad 
del Este, Paraguay, with Hizballah and other terrorist organizations and the consistency 
of the rhetoric from the above mentioned mosques with Hizballah’s ideology and tactics, 
it is clear that the developing Islamic religious infrastructure in Ecuador provides a 
potentially valuable mechanism for Hizballah to increase levels of communal and 
ideological support from the Lebanese diaspora.172   
As outline in Chapter II, Hizballah’s promotion of radical religious ideology in 
Ecuador is consistent with its use to increase its legitimacy by mitigating any sources of 
opposition received from members of its radical constituency to the increased 
participation in the Lebanese political system.       
C. GEO-STRATEGIC VARIABLES 
The most significant geo-strategic variable contributing to a hospitable 
environment for Hizballah’s fundraising operations is Ecuador’s proximity to FARC 
strongholds.  The spillover effects of Plan Colombia make control of the Northern border 
particularly difficult for the weak institutions of the Ecuadorian government.  While 
estimates of displaced Colombians entering Ecuador to flee the conflict are rough, they 
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can conservatively be placed at forty thousand a year since 2001.173  Ecuador does not 
have an adequate infrastructure of social institutions required to provide assistance to this 
volume of displaced persons.  Additionally, despite U.S. financial aid, the combination of 
Ecuadorian military and police forces have been unable to prevent the cross-border 
trafficking of drugs and weapons to and from the FARC controlled departments of 
Potomayo and Narino.174  Widespread corruption of military and police officials further 
reduces the capability of these inefficient institutions.  In 2003, the International Crisis 
Control Group (ICG) estimated that forty percent of Colombian cocaine exits through 
Ecuador and fifty percent of the weapons and explosives used by the FARC enter through 
the same routes.175  A 2003 investigation of the military’s weapons inventory, by 
Octavio Romero, chief of the Ecuadorian Armed Forces Joint Command, revealed a 
significant amount of weapons, ammunition, and explosives disappeared from armed 
forces warehouses since 1998.176   As a result of this investigation, thirty-seven military 
officers have been investigated for corruption.   
The primary response of the Ecuadorian government to its border issues with 
Colombia has been to increase the military and police presence in border areas.  
However, merely increasing the presence of the military and police is unlikely to 
significantly reduce cross-border weapons and drug shipments considering the 
established history of corruption within the military and police and their extensive 
cooperation with the FARC.177  Although the majority of documented deficiencies in the 
Ecuadorian government’s ability to control its Northern border deal specifically with Plan 
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Colombia and the FARC, the suspected links between Hizballah and the FARC make 
Ecuador’s strategic proximity to Colombia and the weakness of its governmental 
institutions contributing factors to the creation of a hospitable environment for 
Hizballah’s fundraising operations.          
D. HOST-NATION CHARACTERISTICS 
The Ecuadorian government’s inability to reduce the level Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations within Ecuador results primarily from a combination of political and 
geographic factors.  The consequence of these characteristics is the creation of a 
favorable environment for terrorist fundraising operations within Ecuador.  Common 
themes influencing each factor are the weakness of government institutions and the 
pervasiveness of corruption throughout government institutions resulting in their inability 
or unwillingness to efficiently confront a variety of significant problems.   The overall 
ability of the government to combat internal instability and external conflict (spill-over 
from Colombian conflict) is low: a recent survey rated the efficiency of the Ecuadorian 
military at only eleven percent.178  Widespread corruption further erodes the 
effectiveness of weak institutions.  The 2003 Transparency International Corruption 
Report rated Ecuador the third most corrupt country in Latin America.179    
 A significant level of political instability in the Ecuadorian government 
compounds the implications of weak institutions.180  The relationship between the 
international and domestic political systems is best described by Robert Putnam’s 
examination of the dynamics of international relations on two levels.  According to 
Putnam, a reciprocal causal relationship exists between international and domestic 
politics resulting in constraints under which negotiators maneuver to achieve 
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advantageous international negotiations.181  Since his election in 2002, President 
Gutierrez has negotiated significant international policy decisions with an increasing 
level of domestic opposition from elites, indigenous groups, and small insurgency 
operations.  The two policies resulting in the most domestic opposition are Ecuador’s 
agreement with the U.S. to allow the U.S. military to conduct counter-drug operations 
from the Manta forward operating location (FOL) and neo-liberal economic reforms 
(most notably, dollarization and FTAA negotiations) designed to stabilize a fragile 
economy fresh off the 1999 banking system collapse.182  This domestic opposition 
results in demonstrations and sporadic terrorist acts (low intensity propaganda 
bombings).  While the focus of these demonstrations is often anti-government or anti-
globalization, an increasing number have been anti-U.S. and anti-western.183  A general 
description of the sources of domestic opposition in Ecuadorian government’s two-level 
game relative to regional U.S. policy preferences is provided in Table 8. 
Table 8.  Ecuador’s Domestic Political Opposition 
  
      Level of Perceived U.S. Interaction 
 LOW HIGH 
LIKE Negative  
(Frustration) 
Assurance 
UNLIKE Negative  
(Lesser of two evils) 
Oppressive 
  
The degree of coherence between U.S. and Latin American regional economic 
and counter-terrorism/narcotics policies and the perceived level of U.S. involvement in 
each issue determines the level of domestic unrest in Ecuador.  In general, the policy 
preferences of Ecuador and the U.S. regarding regional economics and counter-
terrorism/narcotics issues are sufficiently different and Ecuador’s domestic perception of 
the level of U.S. interaction is sufficiently high to make President Gutierrez’s two-level 
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game oppressive.  The net result of an oppressive two-level game is that policy decisions 
are often influenced by negative pressure from the domestic and international systems.  
While this environment does not necessarily result in ineffective policy decisions, it does 
produce significant political instability.  This political instability can potentially limit the 
successful implementation of government policy.   
One of the most significant characteristics of Ecuador’s government contributing 
to its inability to effectively combat Islamic terrorism is the general perception among 
many high-ranking officials that Islamic terrorist groups are not active inside 
Ecuador.184  The fundamental difference between the terrorist threat perception of the 
U.S. and Ecuadorian governments is a significant factor preventing the establishment of 
effective anti-terrorism policy in Ecuador.  The difference in terrorist threat perceptions 
between the U.S. and Ecuadorian governments facilitates the creation of an environment 
hospitable to terrorist fundraising operations.  As demonstrated in Chapter III, a terror 
threat perception gap also exists between the U.S. and Paraguay.185     
Ecuador has a history as a transit location for known Islamic terrorists.  One of the 
earliest examples of Hizballah terrorist activity in Ecuador occurred in 1998.  Seven 
terrorists identified by Interpol as members of Hizballah, and linked to the bombing of 
the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires by several international intelligence agencies, were 
detained in Quito.186  Evidence of Ecuador being an international transit point for 
Islamic terrorists surfaced again in 1998 when Muhammad Ubayd Abd-al Al was arrested 
in Ecuador on his way to Colombia.187  Muhammad Ubayd Abd-al-Al was wanted by 
the Egyptian government for crimes he committed while a member of the terrorist 
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organization Islamic Jihad (a known offshoot of Hizballah).188  After the terrorist attacks 
of September 11, 2001, Ecuadorian and U.S. intelligence organizations conducted 
investigations of 207 tourists of Arab origin who entered and remained in Ecuador from 
1999 to 2001.189 190  While the results of these investigations have not been made 
public, the weakness and corruption of Ecuadorian government institutions contributed to 
the creation of an environment hospitable to terrorist operations.  Hundreds of false 
identification documents were seized and several government officials were arrested from 
Quito’s Civil Registry office.191  Additionally, these investigations accounted for only 
those tourists who registered with immigration offices, not those who entered Ecuador 
illegally.  There are likely to be a significant number of people of Arab origin in Ecuador 
illegally considering the government’s inability to effectively control its borders.  
Although these false documents were not linked to tourists of Arab origin, the potential 
exists for false documents to be available to members of terrorist organizations from 
government institutions.  In an October 2001 interview with a Quito journalist, Ecuador’ 
Foreign Minister Heinz Moeller, ruled out the existence of Islamic terrorist cells in 
Ecuador and claimed that no U.S. intelligence agents were in the country, despite his 
knowledge of FBI and CIA involvement in active investigations of terror cells and the 
history of arrests of Islamic terrorists in Ecuador.192  In an April 2002 interview with a 
Guayaquil journalist, then President Gustavo Noboa said, “It is obvious that there is no 
al-Qa’ida or anything like that here.  There is no existence of that here.”193  The rhetoric 
of high-ranking government officials directly contradicts evidence of the existence of 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
189 According to information supplied by the Immigration Directorate of Quito, 105 of the 207 Arab 
tourists in Ecuador were Lebanese. 
190 “Ecuador Investigating Entry of Arab Tourists in Past Two Years,” Paris AFP to Mexico Central 
America and the Caribbean, 21 September 2001, FBIS Document ID: LAP20010921000100, and “Foreign 
Minister Confirms FBI, CIA to Hunt for Possible Bin-Ladin’s Cell in Ecuador,” Guayaquil CRE Satelital, 
18 September 2001, FBIS Document ID: LAP20010919000106. 
191 “Ecuador Investigating Entry of Arab Tourists in Past Two Years,” Paris AFP to Mexico Central 
America and the Caribbean, 21 September 2001, FBIS Document ID: LAP20010921000100. 
192 “Foreign Minister: Ecuador Not Among Countries Harboring Terrorists,” Guayaquil El Universo, 
4 October 2001, FBIS Document ID: LAP20011004000030. 
193 “Ecuador’s Noboa Remarks on Domestic Issues, al-Qa’ida Presence,” Guayaquil Ecuavisa 
Television, 22 April 2002, FBIS Document ID: LAP20020422000052.  
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Hizballah operations in Ecuador, and is indicative of the government’s perception that the 
terrorist threat is insignificant.  Table 9 lists the characteristics of Ecuador that contribute 
to its permissiveness for terrorist fundraising operations.      
Table 9.   Characteristics Contributing to Ecuador’s Permissiveness   
 
    
Permissive Threat Environments (include both geo-strategic variables and Diaspora 
characteristics). 
 Weak political institutions 
 Widespread government corruption 
 Weak legal framework (relating to anti-terror and anti-money laundering laws) 
 Prominent Lebanese Diasporas (Lebanese businessmen) 
 Geo-strategic location (high profit-potential economic environments) 
 Communal support of Diaspora (Low) 
 Ideological support of Diaspora (Low) 
  
Based on the analysis in this chapter, it is clear that several variables combine to 
determine the nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Ecuador: 
the weakness of Ecuadorian political institutions; the favorable geo-strategic 
characteristics of Ecuador; the strength of the Lebanese diaspora’s business/economic 
network; and evidence suggesting that the religious composition of the Lebanese diaspora 
is becoming more Islamic- and appears to support radical religious ideology consistent 
with Hizballah’s ideology.  There are several significant problems with Ecuador’s 
political landscape that combine to facilitate Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  A brief 
summary of the most significant problems of the Ecuadorian political landscape are 
widespread corruption of government officials, weak institutions, inefficient border 
control, and the lack of a consistent perception among government officials that terrorism 
is a legitimate problem.  Ecuador has significant geo-strategic characteristics that make it 
a likely “haven” for terrorist fundraising operations by simultaneously capitalizing on the 
weaknesses of the political institutions and the strengths of the surrounding cultural 
resources.  Ecuador’s proximity to the FARC-controlled drug trafficking zone in 
Colombia makes it a strategic component of international drug shipment routes.  The 
increased presence of mosques in Ecuador’s religious landscape disseminating radical 
religious rhetoric consistent with pro-Islamic fundamentalist ideology (seen in the 
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Paraguay) indicates that Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora potentially provides Hizballah 
operatives with essential levels of cover and legitimacy to conduct successful fundraising 
operations.  While evidence appears to suggest that these mosques have yet to achieve 
any significant level of traction within the Lebanese diaspora (relative to mosques in 
Paraguay for example), any future indication that these mosques are becoming more 
widely supported by members of the Lebanese diaspora is a sign of increasing levels of 
ideological support for Hizballah.  Any substantial increase in the levels of ideological 
support would likely encourage Hizballah to increase the variety and scope of its 
fundraising operations in Ecuador.        
Several observations can be made about the relative strength of the characteristics 
contributing to the creation of a terrorist threat environment in Ecuador.  The lack of 
evidence documenting any significant amount of donations made by Ecuador’s Lebanese 
diaspora to Hizballah-linked organizations in Lebanon indicates low levels of communal 
and ideological support.  However, Hizballah appears to be actively involved in efforts to 
increase the level ideological support within Ecuador’s Lebanese diaspora, through the 
promotion of radical Islam.  While the degree of success these activities have produced to 
date is unclear, the pattern established in Paraguay linking mosques to high levels of 
ideological support suggests a promising future.  The small size of the Lebanese 
Diaspora’s Islamic population (relative to the size of its Christian population) indicates a 
low potential for ideological support within the diaspora.  However, the recent increase in 
the Islamic presence in Ecuador, demonstrated by the emergence of mosques espousing 
radical Islamic rhetoric consistent with that used by Hizballah to legitimize its violence, 
suggests an increase in the ideological support base for Hizballah within Ecuador’s 
Lebanese Diaspora.  Low levels of communal and ideological support likely explain why 
no evidence suggests Hizballah uses donations or extortion.  Furthermore, low levels of 
communal and ideological support may explain why geo-strategic variables and the 
relationship with influential Lebanese businessmen appear to be the most significant 
factors contributing to the nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations.  
After all, support from the Lebanese diaspora is less important to the success of 
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fundraising operations when a relatively small amount of businessmen, who are 
sympathetic to Hizballah, can take advantage of favorable geo-strategic variables. 
Table 10 provides a useful guide to analyze how the geo-strategic variables, host-
nation characteristics, and diaspora characteristics of Ecuador shape the fundraising 
operations likely to be employed there.  Table 10 combines the list of fundraising 
techniques used by Hizballah in Ecuador (Table 7) with the characteristics that contribute 
to Ecuador’s permissiveness (Table 9).  Characteristics of permissive threat environments 
are listed along the horizontal axis and the menu of options available for fundraising 
operations are listed along the vertical axis.  Environmental characteristics favorable to a 
particular fundraising operation will be indicated with an X at the point of intersection.   























































       
Money 
laundering X  X  X   
Smuggling 
    X   
Drug 
trafficking X X X  X   
 
The influence of low levels of communal and ideological support evident in 
Ecuador on the nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in the 
country are important because they validate the point made in Chapter III that diaspora 
characteristics become increasingly important to fundraising operations when similarities 
in geo-strategic variables and host nation characteristics evident across cases shape 




The examination of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay and Ecuador 
demonstrates how variations in geo-strategic variables, host-nation characteristics, and 
diaspora characteristics produce a wide range of fundraising options.  Hizballah’s 
apparent ability to adapt fundraising tactics to the particular characteristics of specific 
environments suggests the organization applies a flexible strategy to its regional 
fundraising operations.  The diversity of fundraising tactics used and the strategic 
flexibility underscores the nature of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Latin America.  
The scope and volume of fundraising operations conducted in environments with 
favorable characteristics and Hizballah’s ability to operate in environments with less than 
ideal characteristics highlights the significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in 
Latin America.       
The analytical framework developed in Chapter II establishes two significant 
generalizations about how and where terrorist organizations are likely to conduct 
fundraising operations.  First, according to Table 3, the characteristics of permissive 
threat environments that are favorable to the largest variety of fundraising operations are 
weak political institutions, widespread government corruption, weak laws (relating to 
terrorism and money laundering), and geo-strategic location (near high profit-potential 
economic environments).  Second, the analysis conducted in Paraguay and Ecuador 
indicates that the levels of communal and ideological support from diasporas are the two 
characteristics of permissive threat environments that produce the largest variation in 
fundraising operations.              
The nature and significance of Hizballah’s fundraising operations in Paraguay are 
largely a result of favorable geo-strategic variables, host-nation characteristics, and 
diaspora characteristics.  Predictably then, a wide range of fundraising operations is 
employed by Hizballah in Paraguay that result in a large volume of financial profits.  In 
Ecuador as well, geo-strategic variables and host-nation characteristics are favorable to 
fundraising operations.  More interesting however, Hizballah appears to have tailored its 
fundraising operations in Ecuador to mitigate the influence of the less than ideal diaspora 
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characteristics and maximize the potential of favorable host-nation characteristics and 
geo-strategic variables.  Hizballah’s use of money laundering and drug trafficking for 
fundraising capitalizes on favorable host-nation characteristics and geo-strategic variables 
and is not overly dependent on either communal or ideological support from the diaspora.  
Evidence linking Hizballah to the emergence of Islamic mosques in Ecuador, that 
promote radical religious ideology consistent with Hizballah’s ideology, indicates that 
Hizballah recognizes a need to increase its ideological support base in Ecuador.  
Hizballah’s promotion of radical religious ideology in Ecuador is consistent with its 
organizational use of radical ideology to increase its legitimacy by mitigating any sources 
of opposition it receives from members of its radical constituency in response to 
increased participation in the Lebanese political system.  This relationship specifically 
identifies diasporas as strategically valuable to terrorist operations and results in several 
important policy implications for their treatment by host-nations determined to combat 
terrorist operations. 
While Paraguay and Ecuador share many common characteristics defining 
permissive threat environments, the difference in the religious demographics of each 
Lebanese diaspora provides valuable insights into the utility of ideology-based rhetoric 
and demonstrates the latent potential for future support held by otherwise seemingly 
benign diasporas.  The implications of seemingly benign diasporas having latent potential 
must be reconciled with the demonstrated need to focus counter-terrorism attention on 
diasporas.  The success of any such reconciliation process will depend on the 
effectiveness of policies implemented to regulate government-diaspora relations. 
A. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The analysis in this thesis focuses primarily on Hizballah’s fundraising operations 
in Latin America.  While this approach explains Hizballah’s fundraising operations in a 
specific region of the world, relative to that region’s geo-strategic variables, host-nation 
characteristics, and diaspora characteristics, future research into Hizballah’s fundraising 
operations in other regional environments will undoubtedly contribute to the 
generalizations made in Chapter II regarding how and where terrorist organizations 
conduct fundraising operations.   
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The apparent influence of different diaspora characteristics on Hizballah’s 
fundraising operations in Paraguay and Ecuador requires the focus of future research on 
the roles of diasporas in terrorist fundraising operations be expanded from current 
characteristics to also include future potential.  The focus on potential is justified by 
Hizballah’s ability to modify its fundraising operations in Ecuador to mitigate the 
influence of unfavorable diaspora characteristics.  In this respect, other diasporas whose 
characteristics are seemingly unfavorable to terrorist fundraising operations may still 
have the potential to provide terrorist organizations with favorable environments to 
conduct fundraising operations.  A more comprehensive understanding of the forms this 
potential takes and how its development can be prevented will likely limit the scope of 
future terrorist fundraising operations.                    
Based on the research conducted on Hizballah’s fundraising operations in 
Ecuador, future research should attempt to further develop the operational links between 
Hizballah and the FARC.  When considering how different terrorist threat perceptions 
between the U.S. and the governments of Ecuador and Paraguay contributed to the 
development of permissive threat environments, future research into sources of differing 
perceptions can potentially limit future perception gaps and improve the overall 
effectiveness of U.S. counter-terrorism policy.  
B. POTENTIAL POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In response to Richard Armitage’s classification of Hizballah as terrorism’s “A-
team”, Martin Kramer stated, “If Hizballah is the A-team, Iran is the team owner and 
Syria is the coach.”194  Continued diplomatic pressure on Hizballah’s main state 
supporters will likely increase the importance of its fundraising operations.  The proper 
application of counter-terrorism policy based on the insights provided in this thesis about 
how host-nation characteristics, geo-strategic variables, and diaspora characteristics 
shape these fundraising operations will likely further isolate Hizballah and decrease the 
threat it poses to U.S. national security.  
                                                 
194 Martin Kramer, remarks made during a conference titled “The Terrorism of Hizballah: Ideology, 
Scope, Threat,” at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., January 2003.  
Available online at: http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=events.event_summary&event_id=16184, 
Accessed on 11/9/04.   
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The degree to which the terrorist threat perceptions gaps between the U.S. and the 
governments of Ecuador and Paraguay contributed to the creation of permissive threat 
environments, future diplomatic efforts must be directed toward recognizing and 
decreasing these perception gaps.  The Palestinian-Israeli conflict currently drives 
Hizballah’s rhetorical campaign.  Therefore, a long-term solution to the Palestinian-
Israeli conflict will further erode Hizballah’s foundation of ideological and decrease the 
profit potential for its fundraising operations in environments where ideological support 
is a facilitating factor.    
The implications of government-diaspora relations are vital to any successful 
counter-terrorism policy, especially when host-nation governments and diasporas have a 
vested interest in dispelling the automatic causal link between terrorism and diasporas.                       
1. Determine the counter-terrorist relationship between diasporas and host-
nations. 
2. Determine how to effectively engage diasporas to reduce the likelihood of 
terrorist operations. 195         
When a host-nation perceives a diaspora exclusively in terms of being a part of 
the terrorist problem, and not part of a potential solution, the overall effectiveness of its 
counter-terrorism operations will be limited.  Therefore, governments must recognize that 
coordination with diasporas can effectively contribute to their counter-terrorism 
operations.  In this respect, diasporas must be considered not only as potential security 
threats, but also as vital assets to effective counter-terrorism efforts.196  To date, no 
evidence exists indicating that the governments of Paraguay or Ecuador have coordinated 
their respective counter-terrorism efforts with the Lebanese diasporas in their countries.  
High levels of communal and ideological support for Hizballah in Paraguay may 
potentially limit the usefulness of this approach in Paraguay.  However, low levels of 
communal and ideological support for Hizballah in Ecuador indicate the likely utility of 
this approach in Ecuador.   
                                                 
195 Margaret Purdy, “Targeting Diasporas: The Canadian Counter-Terrorism Experience,” pp. 23-24.  
Available online at: http://www.armedgroups.org/images/stories/pdfs/purdy_paper.pdf, Accessed on 
12/3/04. 
196 Rex Bryden, Diaspora Populations and Security Issues in Host Countries, a paper presented to the 
Metropolis Interconference Seminar, Dubrovnik, May 2002, p. 14.  Available online at: 
http://www.international.metropolis.net/events/croatia/brynen.pdf, Accessed on 11/2/04. 
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This recognition depends on the assumption that diasporas are not unitary, but are 
composed of individuals possessing varying degrees of agreement with the ideology of 
the terrorist organization associated with the diaspora.  In this context, members of 
diasporas who do not accept the ideology or tactics of a terrorist organization conducting 
fundraising operations can be invaluable sources of information for counter-terrorism 
operations.  Again, low levels of communal and ideological support for Hizballah in 
Ecuador can factor into this relationship.  On the other hand, high levels of communal 
and ideological support for Hizballah in Paraguay will likely limit the volume and utility 
of information the Paraguayan government can expect to get from the Lebanese diaspora.  
In this case, the social framework of the diaspora and the tactics employed by the terrorist 
organization to maintain support within the diaspora may make cooperation with the 
host-government’s counter-terrorism efforts risky for these diaspora members.197  As a 
result, in order to maximize the utility of the diaspora and the effectiveness of its counter-
terrorism operations, the host-nation must have a sufficient level of interaction with the 
diaspora to recognize potential sources of cooperation and to understand how best to 













                                                 
197 Rohan Gunaranta, “Sri Lanka: Feeding the Tamil Tigers,” in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, 
The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. (Boulder: International Peace 
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